Data Sources and Judgment Framework References
This skill references scenario-level configuration ../../CLAUDE.md.
For source annotation conventions ([YD]/[WKL]/[BD]/[GOV]/[model]), see the scenario-level references/ directory.
/equity-split-design
Purpose
To provide equity structure design plans for founding teams / early-stage companies, covering:
- Initial equity allocation — comprehensive consideration of capital contribution, contribution, and expected roles
- Control retention mechanisms — preventing founders from losing control of the company
- Dynamic adjustment mechanisms — adjustment paths linked to performance, milestones, and service periods
- Equity incentive integration — coordinated design with ESOP
- Legal risk alerts — common pitfalls such as deadlock, nominee shareholding, and exit
Jurisdiction Assumption
Default jurisdiction is mainland China, applying the Company Law (2024 revision).
Part One: Fundamentals of Equity Structure
The Underlying Logic of Equity Allocation
Equity allocation is not simply a matter of ratio numbers, but acontrol + economic benefits + risk bearingcomprehensive arrangement.
| Consideration Dimension |
Description |
| Capital contribution amount |
Currency / physical assets / intellectual property / land use rights |
| Human contribution |
Entrepreneurial commitment, full-time/part-time, technology/resources/management |
| Expected role |
CEO/technical lead/marketing lead/pure financial investor |
| Risk bearing |
Whether to bear personal liability for business failure |
| Exit cost |
Time already invested, opportunity cost |
Reference Model for Founding Team Equity Allocation
创始人总数 × 股权结构建议（未引入外部投资人前）：
├── 1人创业：创始人100%（可预留ESOP池10-15%）
├── 2人创业：
│ ├── 互补型：60/40 ~ 70/30（主创始人主导）
│ └── 对等型：50/50（⚠️ 风险高，易陷入僵局）
├── 3人创业：
│ ├── 核心创始人：50-60%
│ ├── 第二创始人：20-30%
│ └── 第三创始人：10-20%
└── 4人以上：核心创始人控制（建议设置一致行动人）
Same shares with different rights in a limited liability company
Article 84 of the Company Law: The articles of association may provide that voting rights are exercised not in proportion to capital contributions.
| Model |
Description |
| Pure non-proportional voting rights |
The articles of association provide that shareholder A with 51% equity enjoys 67% voting rights |
| Multiple voting rights shares |
Specified shareholders enjoy N votes per share (must be expressly provided in the articles of association) |
| One-vote veto right |
Grant specified shareholders veto rights over major matters (provided in the articles of association) |
Part Two: Control Retention Mechanisms
Tool One: AB Shares (Limited to Specific Entities)
| Company Type |
AB Share Feasibility |
Basis |
| Limited liability company |
✅ Can be achieved through non-proportional voting rights provided in the articles of association |
Article 84 of the Company Law |
| Joint stock limited company (A-share main board) |
❌ Not allowed |
Article 103 of the Company Law |
| Listed companies on the STAR Market/ChiNext |
✅ Allowed to issue shares with special voting rights |
STAR Market/ChiNext listing rules |
| Hong Kong listed companies |
✅ Allowed |
Hong Kong Stock Exchange Listing Rules |
| U.S.-listed Chinese concept stocks |
✅ Allowed |
U.S. SEC rules |
Tool 2: Concert party agreement
Definition: Multiple shareholders agree to exercise voting rights consistently on specified matters, forming bundled voting.
| Key points |
Description |
| Scope of application |
All matters at shareholders' meetings / specific major matters |
| Agreement term |
Recommended fixed term (3-5 years) + automatic renewal clause |
| Consequences of breach |
Agreed liquidated damages / equity repurchase trigger conditions |
| Typical structure |
Founding team signs a concert party agreement, controlling ≥51% of voting rights |
Tool 3: Voting rights proxy
- Investors entrust voting rights to the founder for exercise
- Commonly used for: investors giving up interference in operations while the founder maintains control
- A written agreement must clearly specify the scope and term of the entrustment
Tool 4: Limited partnership shareholding platform
| Structure |
Description |
| LP (limited partner) |
Enjoys economic returns, does not participate in management |
| GP (general partner) |
Executes partnership affairs, controls the voting rights of the shareholding platform |
| Application scenarios |
Employee shareholding platform, founder team control tool |
The founder or a legal entity controlled by the founder serves as GP, achieving "small proportion of capital contribution + large proportion of control."
Tool 5: Equity holding on behalf of another
| Situation |
Risk |
Recommendation |
| Formalization of a dormant shareholder |
Dispute between the nominee shareholder and creditors |
Complete the industrial and commercial change registration as soon as possible |
| Validity of the nominee holding agreement |
Effective only between the two parties to the nominee holding arrangement, cannot be asserted against bona fide third parties |
Retain capital contribution evidence |
| Listed company |
⚠️ CSRC prohibits equity nominee holding |
Regulatory provisions must be strictly observed |
Part Three: Dynamic adjustment mechanism
Types of adjustment trigger conditions
| Type |
Trigger condition |
Adjustment direction |
| Service vesting |
25% unlocks respectively upon completing 1/2/3/4 years |
Unvested portion recovered upon departure |
| Performance vesting |
Additional equity unlocks upon achieving KPIs |
Performance-linked allocation |
| Milestone vesting |
Product launch/revenue target met/financing completed |
Allocation by stage contribution |
| Dilution protection |
Anti-dilution clause for subsequent financing |
Full ratchet / half ratchet |
| Repurchase trigger |
Founder departure/crime/competition |
Repurchase at the agreed price |
Vesting mechanism design elements
标准Vesting安排（4年总期限，每年25%匀速解锁）：
第一年：0%（第一年为悬崖期，满1年后一次性解锁25%）
第二年：25%
第三年：50%
第四年：75%
离职时：
├── 已行权 → 保留
├── 已成熟但未行权 → 离职后30天内行权
└── 未成熟 → 公司回购，回购价 = 原价 × 折扣系数
Good Leaver / Bad Leaver clauses
| Category |
Situation |
Equity treatment |
| Good Leaver |
Death/disability/severe illness/dismissal by the company (non-fault) |
Retain all vested equity |
| Bad Leaver |
Voluntary resignation/discipline violation/competition/leakage of secrets |
Partial repurchase of vested equity (original price or original price × discount) |
| Intermediate state |
Underperformance / role adjustment |
Negotiate or handle as agreed |
Part Four: Common Equity Structure Risks
Equity deadlock
| Scenario |
Risk |
Resolution plan |
| 50/50 equal equity |
Shareholders' meeting cannot form an effective resolution |
Establish a deadlock-breaking mechanism (one party has the right to buy the other party's equity at an agreed price) |
| 50/50 + equal board votes |
Board deadlock |
Founder serves as chairman, and major matters require the founder's consent |
| Close to 2/3 equity structure |
Major shareholder can unilaterally pass major matters |
The articles of association stipulate that specific matters require the consent of all shareholders |
Equity dilution and anti-dilution
| Mechanism |
Description |
| Full Ratchet |
If the valuation in a subsequent financing is lower than this round, the investor's equity is recalculated based on the new valuation |
| Weighted Average |
Broad-based anti-dilution, adjusted price = (original price × original number of shares + new price × number of new shares) / (original number of shares + number of new shares) |
| Preemptive right |
In subsequent financing, existing shareholders have a pro rata preemptive right to subscribe |
Exit mechanism design
| Exit method |
Description |
| Equity repurchase |
The company / other shareholders repurchase at an agreed price |
| Equity transfer |
Transfer to a third party (note the right of first refusal) |
| IPO exit |
Sell in the secondary market after the lock-up period expires |
| Dissolution and liquidation |
Upon dissolution of the company, distribute remaining assets according to shareholding ratio |
Part Five: Legal Analysis Framework
Index of core legal provisions
| Matter |
Legal provision |
| Autonomy of the articles of association over voting rights in a limited liability company |
Article 84 of the Company Law |
| One share, one vote principle for a joint stock limited company |
Article 103 of the Company Law |
| Special voting rights of a joint stock limited company |
Article 103 of the Company Law (exception clause) |
| Validity of shareholders' meeting resolutions |
Articles 25-26 of the Company Law |
| Right of first refusal for equity transfer |
Article 84 of the Company Law (limited liability company) |
| Share transfer of a joint stock company |
Articles 143-149 of the Company Law |
| Legal effect of equity holding on behalf of another |
Article 24 of the Judicial Interpretation of the Company Law (III) |
| Shareholder's right to know |
Article 57 of the Company Law |
Equity structure design compliance review checklist
- Whether the equity structure complies with the mandatory provisions of the Company Law for the specific company type
- Whether the articles of association clearly stipulate special voting rights arrangements
- Whether there is equity holding on behalf of another, and if so, whether the legal risks have been assessed
- Whether the concert party agreement / voting rights entrustment is in writing
- Whether the Vesting mechanism is consistent with the company's registered equity
- Whether the equity transfer includes a right of first refusal clause
- Whether the exit mechanism clauses are complete (repurchase/transfer conditions)
- Whether there is a potential conflict of interest with a competing business or a conflict with non-compete obligations
Part Six: Output Format
Format One: Equity Structure Design Plan
# 股权结构设计方案
## 公司基本信息
| 项目 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| 公司类型 | 有限责任公司 |
| 注册资本 | [___]万元 |
| 设立时间 | [___] |
| 行业 | [___] |
## 现有股东结构
| 股东 | 持股比例 | 出资方式 | 角色 |
|---|---|---|---|
| [创始人A] | [___]% | [___] | [___] |
| [创始人B] | [___]% | [___] | [___] |
| [ESOP池] | [___]% | [___] | [___] |
## 股权结构设计方案
| 股东 | 持股比例 | 表决权安排 | 备注 |
|---|---|---|---|
| [创始人A] | [___]% | [___]票/股] | 控制权设计：[AB股/一致行动人/GP] |
| [创始人B] | [___]% | [___] | [___] |
| [ESOP池] | [___]% | [无表决权/___] | 由[___]担任GP |
## 控制权保留机制
- [ ] 一致行动人协议：[是/否]
- [ ] AB股章程安排：[是/否]
- [ ] 有限合伙GP安排：[是/否]
- [ ] 表决权委托：[是/否]
## Vesting 机制
- 总期限：[___]年
- 解锁节奏：[___]
- 触发条件：[服务期/绩效/里程碑]
- Good Leaver条款：[是/否]
- Bad Leaver条款：[是/否]
## 风险提示
- ⚠️ [___] 存在股权僵局风险
- ⚠️ [___] 存在稀释后控制权旁落风险
- ⚠️ [___] 存在代持法律风险
## 建议后续行动
- [ ] 修订公司章程（约定特殊表决权）
- [ ] 签署一致行动人协议
- [ ] 设立有限合伙持股平台（ESOP）
- [ ] 聘请律师审核 `[SME 核查]`
Format Two: Equity Allocation Consultation Reply
# 股权分配方案咨询
## 咨询问题
[用户的具体问题描述]
## 关键要素
| 要素 | 内容 |
|---|---|
| 公司类型 | [___] |
| 创始人数量 | [___] |
| 出资情况 | [___] |
| 核心诉求 | [控制权/经济利益/退出] |
## 法律分析
- 适用法条：[___]
- 合规性结论：[___]
- 风险评估：[___]
## 方案建议
### 方案A：[标题]
- 股权结构：[___]
- 控制权安排：[___]
- 优点：[___]
- 缺点：[___]
### 方案B：[标题]
- [同上]
## 建议选择
[综合建议及理由]
## 升级决策门
> ⚠️ 本分析仅供初步参考，不构成法律意见。股权结构设计涉及控制权、公司治理及税负等多重复杂因素，建议委托公司法专业律师进行尽职调查并出具正式法律意见。
This skill does not cover
- Representing litigation or arbitration — a litigation lawyer must be retained
- Tax filing or planning — a tax advisor must be consulted
- Securities regulatory compliance — a securities firm/the CSRC must be consulted
- Equity structure of an overseas company — an overseas legal opinion is required
- Confirming legal effect — it must be confirmed by a court or arbitration institution
[SME 核查]
Greater China Legal — corporate-governance — equity-split-design v2.0.0
