marktbeherrschung-bewertung

/kartellrecht:marktbeherrschung-bewertung

Purpose

The skill examines whether an undertaking is dominant within the meaning of § 18 GWB or Art. 102 TFEU and whether specific conduct constitutes an abuse — exclusionary, exploitative or discriminatory abuse as well as the special cases in § 19 II Nos. 1–5 GWB. It also covers the more recent tightening for digital platforms under § 19a GWB (paramount significance across markets) and relative market power under § 20 GWB vis-à-vis small and medium-sized undertakings. The standard is market definition → market position → abuse provision → objective justification.

Inputs

• Description of conduct (exploitation — prices/terms; exclusion — refusal to supply, refusal of access, predatory pricing, margin squeeze, tying, bundling, self-preferencing; discrimination; tapping)
• affected undertaking and market position (market share, revenues, market structure indicators)
• defined product/geographic market (if available)
• if applicable, indications of BKartA proceedings / Commission proceedings / § 19a addressee status
• Client's position: undertaking with market power that must justify itself, or harmed undertaking

Sub-agent architecture

Researcher provides §§ 18, 19, 19a, 20, 21 GWB, Art. 102 TFEU, the Commission's Market Definition Notice, leading ECJ decisions (Hoffmann-La Roche, United Brands, AKZO, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, Google Shopping), BGH Cartel Senate case law and BKartA decisions (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta § 19a). Drafter examines market → market position → abuse → justification. Reviewer checks clean market definition, correct market share presumption, complete examination of the elements and the justification analysis.

Process

1. Market definition

• Product: demand-side market concept — functional substitutability from the perspective of the other side of the market. SSNIP test as an economic auxiliary method (hypothetical price increase of 5–10 %).
• Geographic: area in which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous (national, regional, EEA, worldwide; in digital markets often EEA).
• Time: if applicable, seasonality, product life cycle, innovation markets.

Standard: Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market (OJ 1997 C 372/5; recast 2024 (C/2024/1645)).

2. Dominant position

• § 18 I GWB: no competitors, no substantial competition, or paramount market position; § 18 III criteria (market share, financial strength, access to procurement/sales markets, interlinkages, barriers to market entry, actual/potential competition).
• Market share presumption § 18 IV GWB: ≥ 40 % for one undertaking; joint dominance where ≥ 50 % three or fewer undertakings or ≥ 2/3 of five or fewer undertakings (§ 18 VI).
• § 18 IIIa GWB: multi-sided market criteria (network effects, parallel use of multiple services, economies of scale from data access, innovation pressure).
• § 19a GWB: the BKartA determines by decision paramount cross-market significance (requirement of addressee status); thereafter the BKartA can prohibit certain conduct (self-preferencing, obstruction of multi-channel distribution, data-driven advantages, conditions for preinstallation, obstruction of interoperability) without having to conduct a classic market definition in the individual case. Proceedings since 2022 against Amazon, Apple, Google/Alphabet, Meta.
• § 20 GWB (relative or superior market power): protection of small and medium-sized enterprises that are dependent on a supplier/customer; equated with dominant undertakings for the prohibition of discrimination and obstruction.
• § 21 GWB: prohibition of boycott and exertion of pressure.

3. Abuse provisions § 19 GWB / Art. 102 TFEU

Category	Examples	§ 19 II GWB	Art. 102 TFEU
Obstruction / discrimination abuse	Refusal to supply, refusal of access to an essential facility, predatory pricing, margin squeeze, self-preferencing	No. 1	lit. b, c
Exploitation abuse	excessive prices / unreasonable conditions (comparative market analysis)	No. 2	lit. a
Prohibition of discrimination	unequal treatment without objective justification	No. 3	lit. c
Essential facility / network access	refusal of access to indispensable infrastructure	No. 4	(via lit. b and the Bronner line)
Prohibition of extortion	unreasonable demand for advantages without objective justification	No. 5	(not directly)

Special topics:

• Predatory pricing (predatory pricing): AKZO threshold — price below average variable costs = presumed abusive; between variable and average avoidable/total costs = abusive if intent to eliminate is present (ECJ, AKZO, Case C-62/86).
• Margin squeeze: a vertically integrated undertaking with dominance in the upstream market sets upstream prices such that its own downstream price becomes unprofitable for competitors (ECJ, Deutsche Telekom, C-280/08 P).
• Loyalty rebates / rebates promoting loyalty: Intel case law — effects analysis required (ECJ, Intel, C-413/14 P).
• Self-preferencing by platforms: Google Shopping (General Court, T-612/17; ECJ, C-48/22 P); in addition § 19a No. 1 GWB.
• Data and conditions abuse: BKartA proceedings Facebook (B6-22/16); BGH confirmation; ECJ, Meta Platforms, C-252/21.

4. Objective justification and efficiency defence

Even conduct that appears abusive may be justified by:

• objective justification (e.g. safety, quality, health, IP rights) — proportionality required;
• efficiency defence (analogous to the criteria of Art. 101(3) TFEU; to be proven by the dominant undertaking; rarely successful in practice).

5. Legal consequences

• BKartA: prohibition order § 32 GWB, cease-and-desist order, commitments § 32b GWB, fine § 81 GWB up to 10% of group turnover.
• COM: decision Art. 7 Reg. 1/2003, fine Art. 23 Reg. 1/2003.
• Private legal action: injunction, removal, damages §§ 33–33h GWB; joint and several liability § 33d; passing-on § 33e; limitation period § 33h.
• Civil proceedings: specialised antitrust divisions (Düsseldorf, Munich); local concentration §§ 87 et seq. GWB in conjunction with State ordinances.

6. Relationship to the DMA and sector-specific law

• DMA (Regulation (EU) 2022/1925): separate conduct obligations for gatekeepers — plugin dsa-dma; DMA law applies alongside Art. 102 TFEU / § 19a GWB and does not replace it.
• Telecommunications/energy: TKG, EnWG with priority of sector-specific regulation in certain constellations.

Sources and citation method

Binding: ../../../references/zitierweise.md.

Statute

• § 18 GWB (market dominance, presumptions)
• § 19 GWB (forms of abuse)
• § 19a GWB (undertakings of paramount significance for competition across markets)
• § 20 GWB (relative market power, prohibition of obstruction)
• § 21 GWB (prohibition of boycott)
• §§ 32, 32b GWB (cease-and-desist/commitment decision)
• §§ 33–33h GWB (private enforcement)
• § 81 GWB (framework for fines)
• Art. 102 TFEU
• Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003

Commentaries

• Fuchs, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, 6th ed. 2020, § 18 marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert – Auflagenstand]
• Markert, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, 6th ed. 2020, § 19 marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert – Auflagenstand]
• Eufinger, in: Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff, Kartellrecht, 4th ed. 2020, § 19a GWB marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert]
• Eilmansberger/Bien, in: Münchener Kommentar Wettbewerbsrecht, 3rd ed. 2020, Art. 102 TFEU marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert]

Case law and authority practice ([unverifiziert – prüfen in juris/EuGH-Datenbank/BKartA-Website])

1. ECJ, judgment of 13.02.1979 – Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche (concept of hindrance)
2. ECJ, judgment of 14.02.1978 – Case 27/76, United Brands (market definition bananas)
3. ECJ, judgment of 03.07.1991 – C-62/86, AKZO (predatory pricing test)
4. ECJ, judgment of 14.10.2010 – C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom (margin squeeze)
5. CJEU, judgment of 06.09.2017 – C-413/14 P, Intel (rebate abuse, effects analysis)
6. GC, judgment of 10.11.2021 – T-612/17, Google Shopping (self-preferencing)
7. CJEU, judgment of 04.07.2023 – C-252/21, Meta Platforms (data misuse / interplay with the GDPR)
8. BGH, order of 23.06.2020 – KVR 69/19, Facebook (interim proceedings)
9. BGH, order of 04.07.2023 – KVB 59/22, Amazon § 19a (market position) [unverifiziert – Az./Datum prüfen; in öffentlich verfügbaren Quellen erscheint die Amazon-§-19a-Bestätigung als BGH, Beschl. v. 23.04.2024 – KVB 56/22]
10. BKartA, decision of 06.02.2019 – B6-22/16, Facebook (abuse of terms and conditions)
11. BKartA, decisions 2022 et seq. against Amazon, Apple, Google, Meta concerning § 19a

Output format

GUTACHTEN – Marktbeherrschung und Missbrauch §§ 18, 19 GWB / Art. 102 AEUV
Unternehmen: <Name (anonymisiert)>
Verhalten: <Bezeichnung>
Stand: <Datum>

I. Sachverhalt
II. Frage(n)
III. Kurzantwort

IV. Rechtliche Bewertung
    1. Marktabgrenzung
       a) sachlich (Bedarfsmarktkonzept, SSNIP)
       b) räumlich
       c) zeitlich
    2. Marktbeherrschende / marktstarke Stellung
       a) § 18 I/III GWB
       b) Marktanteilsvermutung § 18 IV GWB
       c) ggf. § 18 IIIa GWB (Plattform-Kriterien)
       d) ggf. § 19a GWB (Adressat? Feststellungsverfahren BKartA)
       e) ggf. § 20 GWB (relative Marktmacht)
    3. Missbrauchstatbestand
       a) Behinderung / Ausbeutung / Diskriminierung / Essential Facility / Anzapfverbot
       b) Spezialtatbestände (Kampfpreis, Marge-Squeeze, Self-Preferencing, Konditionenmissbrauch)
    4. Objektive Rechtfertigung / Effizienzverteidigung
    5. Rechtsfolgen
       - Untersagungsverfügung / Verpflichtungszusagen
       - Bußgeld § 81 GWB / Art. 23 VO 1/2003
       - Schadensersatz §§ 33 ff. GWB

V. Risikoeinstufung
   🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴 <Einstufung mit Begründung>

VI. Empfehlung
    - Verhaltensanpassung / Compliance-Maßnahmen
    - Verpflichtungszusagen § 32b GWB / Art. 9 VO 1/2003
    - Schutzschrift / Reaktion auf Auskunftsverlangen

VII. Quellenverzeichnis

Example (excerpt, legal opinion style)

Platform P favors its own offerings over equivalent third-party offerings in its ranking. The materially relevant market according to the demand-market concept is the market for online marketplace services for end customers in the EEA; indications for a separate market definition as against stationary retail are provided by the Commission's practice (cf. GC, T-612/17, Google Shopping). With a market share of > 40 %, the presumption under § 18 IV GWB applies. The BKartA has also established, by decision of ... [unverifiziert] that the addressee is an undertaking with paramount significance for competition across markets within the meaning of § 19a I GWB; the threshold under § 19a II no. 1 lit. a GWB (favoring its own offerings in intermediation) is applicable to the conduct described. An objective justification on grounds of platform quality or protection against inferior offerings applies only if the self-preferencing conduct is proportionate ; completely hiding equivalent third-party offerings in the prominent ranking slots exceeds this limit. Risk: 🔴 — prohibition order with a fine framework of up to 10 % of group turnover (§ 81 II GWB) as well as damages claims by affected dealers (§§ 33–33h GWB, binding effect § 33b GWB). ...

Risks / typical mistakes

• Market definition too broad ("global digital advertising market") — fails to meet the demand-market concept.
• § 19a GWB assumed without a formal declaratory decision by the BKartA — the prerequisite is the declaratory decision vis-à-vis the specific addressee.
• § 20 GWB confused with § 18 GWB — § 20 protects SMEs against relative market power, without dominance within the meaning of § 18.
• Efficiency defense as a blanket plea — the scope of evidence must be concrete, and the burden of proof lies with the dominant undertaking.
• Prohibition on demanding unjustified advantages § 19 II no. 5 GWB (grocery retail constellations) overlooked.
• Relationship to the DMA misjudged — DMA obligations apply in parallel and are dealt with in the plugin dsa-dma .
• Binding effect § 33b GWB and limitation period § 33h GWB forgotten in follow-on damages claims.