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android-app-reverse

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Updated 10-16 09:31

About this skill

android-app-reverse

Perform Android App reverse engineering analysis on $ARGUMENTS .

MCP Dependencies:

  • frida-mcp — Frida dynamic Hook (spawn/attach/script injection/message reading)
  • adb-mcp — ADB device management (install/file transfer/screenshot/log/input simulation)
  • android_proxy_mcp — Traffic capture (HTTP/HTTPS packet capture/API analysis)

Pre-checks

Confirm the environment before starting analysis:

1. list_devices → 检查 ADB 是否连接到设备
2. get_device_info → 确认设备信息(型号、Android 版本、root 状态)
3. check_frida_status → 检查 frida-server 是否运行
   └── 未运行 → start_frida_server
4. proxy_status → 检查代理服务是否运行(如需抓包)

Analysis Workflow

Select stages flexibly based on the target; not all need to be executed:

Stage 1: Target Identification and Information Gathering

1. list_packages → 查找目标 App 包名
   └── 未安装 → install_app(apk_path) 安装 APK
2. get_frontmost_application → 确认目标 App 在前台
3. pull_file → 提取 APK:
   - /data/app/<package>/base.apk → 本地分析
4. 静态分析(本地执行,非 MCP):
   - jadx / apktool 反编译
   - 查看 AndroidManifest.xml(权限、组件、入口)
   - 识别加固壳(360、腾讯、梆梆等)
   - 定位网络请求相关类

Stage 2: Traffic Capture and API Discovery

Goal: Find the target API request, identify encrypted parameters

1. 配置代理:
   - 手机 WiFi 设置代理 → 指向 android_proxy_mcp 的 IP:8288
   - 需要 HTTPS → get_cert_info 获取 CA 证书安装指引

2. 驱动 App 操作:
   - send_tap(x, y) / send_swipe(...) → 模拟用户操作触发请求
   - send_text("搜索关键词") → 输入文本
   - take_screenshot → 截屏确认当前界面

3. 分析流量:
   - traffic_list → 列出捕获的请求(按域名/状态码筛选)
   - traffic_search("sign") → 搜索包含加密参数的请求
   - traffic_get_detail(reqid) → 查看请求头、响应头
   - traffic_read_body(reqid) → 读取请求/响应体
   
4. 识别加密参数:
   - 记录加密字段名、位置(header/body/query)
   - 记录字段值的特征(长度、编码格式、是否时间相关)
   - 对比多次相同请求,观察哪些字段变化

Stage 3: SSL Pinning Bypass

If HTTPS packet capture fails (certificate error), SSL Pinning needs to be bypassed:

方案 A: Frida 脚本 Hook(推荐)
  spawn(package_name, script_file_path="ssl_bypass.js")
  
  通用 SSL Pinning 绕过脚本思路:
    - Hook TrustManager.checkServerTrusted → 置空
    - Hook OkHttp CertificatePinner.check → 绕过
    - Hook SSLContext.init → 替换为信任所有证书
    - Hook WebViewClient.onReceivedSslError → proceed
  
方案 B: LSPosed + TrustMeAlready 模块(免 Frida)
  参考 references/ssl-pinning-bypass.md

方案 C: 修改 APK(network-security-config)
  解包 → 修改 res/xml/network_security_config.xml → 重打包签名

Stage 4: Dynamic Hook

Goal: Intercept the input and output of encryption functions, understand the encryption logic

4.1 Java-layer Hook

// spawn 或 attach 后注入 Frida 脚本

// Hook 加密方法,打印输入输出
Java.perform(function() {
    var EncryptUtil = Java.use("com.target.utils.EncryptUtil");
    
    EncryptUtil.encrypt.overload("java.lang.String").implementation = function(input) {
        console.log("[encrypt] input: " + input);
        var result = this.encrypt(input);
        console.log("[encrypt] output: " + result);
        return result;
    };
});

Operation Flow:

1. spawn(package_name, initial_script=上述脚本)
   或 attach(package_name, initial_script=上述脚本)
2. 操作 App 触发加密
3. get_messages(max_messages=200) → 读取 hook 输出
4. 分析输入输出关系

4.2 Native-layer Hook (.so files)

// Hook native 函数
Interceptor.attach(Module.findExportByName("libnative.so", "Java_com_target_NativeLib_sign"), {
    onEnter: function(args) {
        console.log("[native sign] arg0: " + args[0]);
        console.log("[native sign] arg1: " + Memory.readUtf8String(args[1]));
    },
    onLeave: function(retval) {
        console.log("[native sign] return: " + Memory.readUtf8String(retval));
    }
});

4.3 Common Hook Targets

Goal Hook Location Purpose
MD5/SHA java.security.MessageDigest.digest Intercept standard Hash
HMAC javax.crypto.Mac.doFinal Intercept HMAC signature
AES/DES javax.crypto.Cipher.doFinal Intercept symmetric encryption
RSA java.security.Signature.sign Intercept asymmetric signature
Base64 android.util.Base64.encodeToString Intercept encoding
SharedPrefs SharedPreferences.getString Read local configuration
OkHttp okhttp3.OkHttpClient.newCall Intercept HTTP request construction

Stage 5: Algorithm Recovery

Based on the Hook results from Stage 4, recover the encryption algorithm:

情况 A: 标准加密算法(MD5/SHA/AES/RSA/HMAC)
  → Hook 拿到 key/iv/salt 等参数
  → 直接用 Python 标准库实现
  → 验证:相同输入 → 相同输出

情况 B: 自定义算法(Java 层)
  → 反编译代码 + Hook 中间值
  → 逐步还原逻辑到 Python
  → 多组数据验证

情况 C: Native 层算法(.so 文件)
  → IDA/Ghidra 反编译 .so
  → Frida hook native 函数拿中间值
  → 还原到 Python 或直接调用 .so(ctypes/cffi)

情况 D: 第三方加固/保护
  → 先脱壳(Frida dump dex)
  → 再按 A/B/C 处理

Anti-patterns

  • Do not attempt Frida on a non-rooted device — Non-root requires repackaging the APK to inject frida-gadget, and the workflow is completely different.
  • Do not ignore ProGuard obfuscation — Class names/method names of most Apps are obfuscated, so you need to search for characteristic strings (such as "sign", "encrypt", "MD5") in the decompiled code to locate the target class.
  • Do not hook only one layer — The signatures of many Apps are multi-step combinations (first MD5, then HMAC, then Base64), so the entire call chain needs to be hooked.
  • Do not forget the timestamp — Most signatures include a time factor, and the timestamp needs to be updated when replaying.
  • spawn vs attach — For hooking before the App starts (such as initialization logic in onCreate), use spawn; for hooking the real-time behavior of an already running App, use attach。

Completion Criteria

分析结果:
- App:$ARGUMENTS
- 目标 API:https://api.example.com/v1/feed
- 加密参数:X-Sign(位于请求头)
- 算法类型:HMAC-SHA256
- 密钥来源:固定密钥,硬编码在 so 层
- Python 实现:output/sign.py(已验证)
- 验证结果:相同输入产生相同签名,HTTP 200 + 业务数据返回

References

Read on demand when encountering specific scenarios:

File When to Read
references/frida-hooks.md When Frida hook templates are needed (Java layer/Native layer/common frameworks)
references/ssl-pinning-bypass.md When HTTPS packet capture fails and SSL Pinning needs to be bypassed
references/common-android-crypto.md When identifying common encryption implementation patterns in Android Apps