ACTION REQUIRED (execute immediately after reading)
NOW: Confirm that the current case'sscope.mdexists andauth.status=granted. No scope →case-init.ps1,forbiddenautomatic-AuthGrantedNOW: Read../../field-journal/precedent-pentest.md— daily operating instructions, does not replace scopeNOW: Confirm whether the current task falls within the applicable scope of this skillNEXT: Read../../tool-index.md, verify tool availability and actual pathsNEXT: When tools are missing, call bootstrap; do not guess pathsACT: Enter the workflow. By default, read only the playbook skeleton;payloader/、waf-bypass.mdopen only when scope has been granted and the user explicitly requests payloadsMUST NOTtreat the "2887 H1 report" as a directory already tracked in this repo (h1-reports/is not in the tree)MUST NOTdisable protection because the payload corpus triggers antivirus alerts; prioritize verifying Git blob/hash anddocs/SECURITY-REVIEW-2026-09-03.md
Practical Security Response Center / crowdtesting / Bug bounty hunting skill. Translates white-box methodology into black-box probing, layered with real case statistics and a payload library.
When to use this skill
Keyword matches:
- "src hunting" / "src vulnerability" / "src testing" / "Security Response Center"
- "bug bounty" / "vulnerability bounty" / "crowdtesting"
- "hackerone" / "h1" / "bugcrowd" / "intigriti" / "yeswehack"
- "how to hunt / how to test / how to attack + a target / an endpoint / a parameter"
- "WAF bypass" / "bypass WAF" / "WAF bypass"
- "any account / arbitrary modification / arbitrary deletion / arbitrary operation" type privilege escalation
- "password reset" / "password recovery" type logic
- "unauthorized access" / "default credentials" / "Actuator" / "Spring exposure" / "Redis unauthorized"
- User gives a URL or API endpoint for you to test
When this skill should not be used:
- Pure white-box source code audit (use
code-auditskill) - Fix/defense Q&A for known vulnerabilities (use general chat)
- Standalone CTF challenges (this is a real-environment workflow)
Workflow — 5 phases
Phase 1 · Intake
Input: program name / SRC entry URL / subdomain.
Things to do:
- Capture Scope (in-scope domains / IPs / mobile apps / API endpoints)
- Capture Out-of-scope (prohibited testing content, third-party services, cloud assets exclusions)
- Capture rules (payout tiers, disclosure window, retest policy, safe-harbor)
- Capture test accounts / test headers (e.g.
X-Bug-Bounty: <handle>)
Priority assessment(estimate hit rate based on matched type; refer to references/methodology/05-srctimebox-priority.md):
- 6-hour window → run high-hit-rate types (password reset 88% / any account 86.4% / withdrawal 83.1%)
- Single-day window → add information disclosure + asset exposure + Actuator
- HVV / peak period → full spectrum
→ See details in references/methodology/00-index.md
Phase 2 · Recon (passive reconnaissance)
Intelligence gathering without sending packets to the target:
- CT logs: crt.sh / Censys (find subdomains)
- Historical snapshots:Wayback / CommonCrawl
- GitHub search:
org:target+ Keywords (password / api_key / SECRET) - Search engine dorks:
site:target.com inurl:/admin、filetype:env、intitle:Index of - ASN / IP ranges: bgp.he.net to find IP blocks
- Favicon hash: FOFA / Shodan to find assets with the same favicon
- DNS history:SecurityTrails / Whoisxmlapi
Phase 3 · Enum (active probing)
Asset enumeration:
- Subdomains: amass / subfinder / puredns / dnsx
- Liveness: httpx / naabu
- Screenshots: gowitness / aquatone
- Content discovery: ffuf / feroxbuster / dirsearch
- Tech fingerprinting: wappalyzer / webanalyze (also check
references/dictionaries/chinese-srcfingerprints.mdto hit domestic components) - JS extraction: linkfinder / subjs / gau / katana
- Subdomain takeover fingerprints: subjack / subzy
Phase 4 · Hunt (vulnerability probing)
Follow the corresponding playbook by attack type,every playbook includes: methodology + parameter frequency table + real H1 cases + structured payload + WAF bypass variants.
Priority paths(sorted by hit rate + value):
| Playbook | Entry hints | File |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized access | Actuator/Swagger/default ports/weak passwords | references/playbooks/unauth-access.md |
| Information disclosure | .git/.svn/.env/heapdump/path listing | references/playbooks/info-disclosure.md |
| Arbitrary X privilege escalation | User-space IDs enumerable/modifiable | references/playbooks/arbitrary-x-authz.md |
| Business logic | Password reset/payment/order/verification code | references/playbooks/logic-flaws.md |
| OAuth/SAML/JWT | Auth flow/redirect_uri/token | references/playbooks/oauth-saml-jwt.md |
| API REST | BOLA/Mass Assignment/rate | references/playbooks/api-rest.md |
| SQLi | Any user input into DB | references/playbooks/sqli.md |
| RCE | Deserialization/SSTI/XXE/prototype chain/framework | references/playbooks/rce.md |
| SSRF | URL parameters/cache/Host injection | references/playbooks/ssrf-cache-host.md |
| Path traversal | File path parameters/LFI/RFI | references/playbooks/path-traversal.md |
| File upload | Upload point + parsing vulnerability | references/playbooks/file-upload.md |
| XSS | Any user input into HTML/JS | references/playbooks/xss.md |
| HTTP smuggling | Reverse proxy + Content-Length | references/playbooks/http-smuggling.md |
| GraphQL | introspection/nesting | references/playbooks/graphql.md |
| Race condition | Concurrent requests / TOCTOU | references/playbooks/race-conditions.md |
| DoS | ReDoS / unlimited resource rate / algorithmic explosion | references/playbooks/dos.md |
| Mobile | Android / iOS APK | references/playbooks/mobile.md |
| LLM Agent | Prompt injection / tool invocation | references/playbooks/llm-prompt-injection.md |
| Internal network post-exploitation | Credentials / lateral movement / domain | references/playbooks/intranet-postexp.md |
General methodology(not divided by attack type):
| Document | Key content |
|---|---|
methodology/01-attack-priority.md |
RCE>file write>auth bypass>injection>information disclosure value ranking |
methodology/02-bypass-toolkit.md |
General bypass decision tree + encoding / obfuscation / WAF |
methodology/03-evidence-discipline.md |
Black-box evidence rules + anti-hallucination + compliance |
methodology/04-control-gap-hunting.md |
9 types of sensitive operations → expected controls → probe for absence |
methodology/05-srctimebox-priority.md |
6h / single-day / HVV / monthly time-box templates |
Industry vertical playbooks(prioritize when asset-related):
| Industry | Document | When to use |
|---|---|---|
| Banking / payment / finance | industry/banking-finance.md |
Target involves payment / online banking / third-party payment aggregation |
| Telecom / ISP | industry/telecom-isp.md |
Target is a carrier / BOSS / network management / IoT SIM |
Dictionaries / credentials:
| Documentation | Purpose |
|---|---|
dictionaries/default-credentials-cn.md |
Domestic credentials for Seeyon / Tongda / Wanhu / Weaver / Yonyou / Kingdee / Huawei / ZTE / Hikvision, etc. |
dictionaries/chinese-srcfingerprints.md |
Domestic OA / middleware fingerprints + high-frequency parameters + one-click detection commands |
Phase 5 · Report (Submission)
→ Use template templates/report-submission.md
three-part skeleton:
- Title: precise to endpoint + vulnerability type, no more than 80 characters
- Reproduction steps: each step executable / screenshots / HAR
- Impact + remediation recommendations: CVSS 4.0 vector + business impact paragraph
MCP tool integration
This skill supports calling a local MCP server as the tool layer.Primary choice jshookmcp(134 curated tools / 386 full set / 36 domains, built-in Burp Suite bridge / Frida / WASM / anti-debugging / Android adb / sourcemap reconstruction). Full index and scenario mapping:
→ references/tools/mcp-jshook.md
Default recommendation search profile (context cost ~3K tokens), via mcp__jshook__search_tools + mcp__jshook__activate_tools activated on demand, avoiding full profile loading 40K+ tokens all at once.
Data asset scale
| Category | Magnitude |
|---|---|
| Attack playbooks | 19 |
| General methodology documents | 6 |
| Industry vertical playbooks | 2 (banking / telecom) |
| Dictionaries / credentials | 3 |
| Report templates | 1 |
| Structured payloads | 305 entries(177 web + 128 intranet) |
| WAF / EDR bypass variants | 263 steps, covering 23 types of Web attacks |
| Tool command quick reference | 114 entries (Nmap/SQLMap/Burp/MSF/...) |
| HackerOne real cases (disclosed High/Critical) | 2887 reports, categorized by weakness into 141 classification MD files |
| WooYun historical case statistics (non-renewable) | 88,636 entries |
H1 real cases have beendirectly embedded at the end of the corresponding playbooks(each playbook ends with a "H1 real cases" Top 12 table + summary).
Compliance and legal red lines
Each playbook has a "things not to do" section at the end. General red lines (observed by any SRC):
- ❌ Assets / domains out of scope → stop immediately and report
- ❌ Actually exfiltrating others' PII → only prove accessibility, destroy immediately
- ❌ Sustained load / DoS / high traffic → only 1–3 PoC packets, stop immediately
- ❌ Modifying others' data (even with write permission) → verify only on objects you control
- ❌ Phishing or social engineering in production → do not do it
- ❌ Submitting unreproduced guesses → must have HTTP packets / screenshots / video evidence
- ✅ Mark yourself in test headers (e.g.
X-Bug-Bounty: <handle>) - ✅ Use your own two accounts to stage privilege escalation scenarios yourself
- ✅ Use OOB domains for SSRF probing, do not use someone else's DNSLog
- ✅ Before submission, use
references/templates/report-submission.mdfor self-check
CLI mnemonic prefix
srchunter(e.g.:srchunter scope set <program>、srchunter recon run、srchunter findings new <type>). The CLI is currently not implemented; this is only a naming convention.
References / Cross-chain structure
src-hunter/
├── SKILL.md # 本文件 — skill 入口
├── README.md # 项目说明
└── references/
├── methodology/ 6 docs # 通用打法
├── playbooks/ 19 docs # 攻击类 playbook(每个含 H1 案例 + Payload 库)
├── industry/ 3 docs # 行业垂直
├── dictionaries/ 3 docs # 字典 / 凭据
├── templates/ 1 doc # 报告模板
├── h1-reports/ # 2887 份 H1 报告原始数据 + 141 类 MD
│ ├── raw/ # 原始 JSON(resume / 二次分析用)
│ └── by-weakness/ # 按 CWE 分类的 Markdown
└── payloader/ # 305 条结构化 payload 数据
├── raw/ # JSON(机读)
├── by-category/ # 按分类的 MD
├── tools/ # 工具命令
└── waf-bypass.md # 263 步骤 WAF 绕过集
Task completion self-check (MUST pass before claiming completion)
- Did I execute every step in the workflow (rather than just reading it)?
- Did I base this on
tool-indexand use the real tool path? - Did I produce reproducible evidence (commands/scripts/screenshots/reports)?
- Did I complete and write back the Checklist items required by RULES?