SuperAPI AI Directory

recon-tree-services

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Updated 10-16 06:43

About this skill

RECON-TREE-SERVICES — Tree Service Company Recon

When to Use

Use when the target scope includes tree service, arborist, tree removal, stump grinding, or landscaping-with-tree-work company domains. These small-to-medium businesses typically run WordPress or custom PHP on shared hosting with minimal security posture, often exposing customer PII via estimate forms, CRM portals, and photo galleries.

Quick Reference

  • Common CMS: WordPress (dominant), custom PHP, Wix, Squarespace
  • Common platforms: Arborgold, ArborNote, SingleOps, Jobber, GorillaDesk
  • Key endpoints: /estimate, /free-estimate, /contact, /request-quote, /service-area
  • Customer portals: Arborgold client login, Jobber client portal (often accessible via subdomain)
  • Key findings: Contact form PII leakage, debug logs, directory listing on uploads, outdated plugins

Step-by-Step

  1. CMS Detection
    curl -skI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "x-powered-by|set-cookie|server"
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "generator|wp-content|wp-json"
    
  1. CRM/Estimating Platform Detection

    # Arborgold — look for /arborgold/ paths
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/arborgold/" | head -20
    # SingleOps — look for /ordering/ or api.singleops.com references
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "singleops\|arborgold\|arbornote\|gorilladesk"
    # Jobber — look for getjobber.com or client.jobber.com redirects
    curl -skI "https://$TARGET/client" | grep -i "jobber"
    
  2. Estimate Form Recon

    # Free estimate forms often POST PII in plaintext
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/estimate" -o /tmp/estimate.html
    grep -oE 'name="[^"]*"' /tmp/estimate.html | sort -u
    grep -oE 'action="[^"]*"' /tmp/estimate.html
    # Check for exposed form submission data
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" | grep -i "estimate\|contact\|submission" | head -20
    
  3. Photo Gallery / Uploads Recon

    # Before/after photo galleries often have directory listing
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/" | head -50
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/gallery/" | head -50
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/images/" | head -50
    grep -oP 'src="[^"]+\.(jpg|png|webp)"' /tmp/estimate.html | sort -u | head -20
    
  4. Service Area Pages

    # City/service area pages often contain embedded Google Maps API keys
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/service-areas" | grep -oP 'AIza[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{35,}' | head -5
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/service-areas" | grep -oP 'key=([^"& ]+)' | head -5
    
  5. Customer Portal Probe

    # Arborgold client portals
    curl -sk "https://client.$TARGET/" | head -20
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET.arborgold.net/" | head -20
    # Jobber client portal
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET.jobber.com/" | head -20
    

Attack Surface Signals

  • URLs with /estimate, /free-estimate, /request-quote, /service-areas
  • Google Maps API keys embedded in service-area or contact pages
  • WordPress + third-party CRM/estimating plugins
  • Before/after photo gallery pages with directory listing enabled
  • Arborgold login page at /arborgold/login or client/<company>.arborgold.net
  • Subdomains like estimates., portal., schedule., book., client.

Common Root Causes

  1. CRM integration PII leakage — Estimate form submissions stored in plaintext or accessible via IDOR in CRM portals
  2. Google Maps API key over-exposure — Keys embedded on service-area pages without referrer restriction
  3. Outdated WordPress plugins — Tree service sites rarely update plugins; photo gallery and contact form plugins are common vulnerabilities
  4. Debug log exposure — wp-content/debug.log with form submissions, SQL queries, and API keys
  5. Directory listing on uploads — Before/after photo galleries often leave directory listing enabled

Related Skills

  • recon-landscaping — Overlapping sector (many companies do both tree and lawn services)
  • recon-smb-services — General SMB recon methodology for local service businesses
  • hunt-wordpress — WordPress-specific vulnerability hunting (dominant CMS for this sector)
  • hunt-source-leak — API key and secret discovery in JS and config files
  • hunt-file-upload — Photo gallery upload vulnerabilities

Bypass Techniques

  • Arborgold client portals at /arborgold/ often have default credentials or no login required — try accessing directly
  • Google Maps API keys on service-area pages are frequently unrestricted — test key against Google Maps API without referrer
  • Estimate form submissions are sometimes stored as PDFs in /estimates/ or /proposals/ directories with sequential filenames
  • Free estimate forms that POST via AJAX may not have CSRF tokens — try direct POST from another origin
  • CRM portal subdomains like client.target.com or estimates.target.com often have weaker auth than the main site
  • Photo galleries with numbered filenames (IMG_0001.jpg, IMG_0002.jpg) — iterate to find all photos including those not linked from pages

Real Examples

From cross-sector mass recon observation:

  • A tree service company's Arborgold CRM portal at /arborgold/ was accessible without authentication, exposing all customer estimates including names, addresses, phone numbers, and tree service quotes
  • Another tree service had debug.log exposed at /wp-content/debug.log containing 500+ form submissions with full customer PII — names, addresses, phone numbers, property descriptions
  • A tree removal company had a Google Maps API key on service-area pages that was unrestricted — any referrer could use it to query Google Maps API at $200/day cost to the business
  • An arborist's Jobber client portal at client.jobber.com/business-name had weak authentication — iterating booking IDs returned customer service history