When to Use
Use when the target scope includes tree service, arborist, tree removal, stump grinding, or landscaping-with-tree-work company domains. These small-to-medium businesses typically run WordPress or custom PHP on shared hosting with minimal security posture, often exposing customer PII via estimate forms, CRM portals, and photo galleries.
Quick Reference
- Common CMS: WordPress (dominant), custom PHP, Wix, Squarespace
- Common platforms: Arborgold, ArborNote, SingleOps, Jobber, GorillaDesk
- Key endpoints:
/estimate,/free-estimate,/contact,/request-quote,/service-area - Customer portals: Arborgold client login, Jobber client portal (often accessible via subdomain)
- Key findings: Contact form PII leakage, debug logs, directory listing on uploads, outdated plugins
Step-by-Step
- CMS Detection
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "x-powered-by|set-cookie|server" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "generator|wp-content|wp-json"
-
CRM/Estimating Platform Detection
# Arborgold — look for /arborgold/ paths curl -sk "https://$TARGET/arborgold/" | head -20 # SingleOps — look for /ordering/ or api.singleops.com references curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "singleops\|arborgold\|arbornote\|gorilladesk" # Jobber — look for getjobber.com or client.jobber.com redirects curl -skI "https://$TARGET/client" | grep -i "jobber" -
Estimate Form Recon
# Free estimate forms often POST PII in plaintext curl -sk "https://$TARGET/estimate" -o /tmp/estimate.html grep -oE 'name="[^"]*"' /tmp/estimate.html | sort -u grep -oE 'action="[^"]*"' /tmp/estimate.html # Check for exposed form submission data curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" | grep -i "estimate\|contact\|submission" | head -20 -
Photo Gallery / Uploads Recon
# Before/after photo galleries often have directory listing curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/" | head -50 curl -sk "https://$TARGET/gallery/" | head -50 curl -sk "https://$TARGET/images/" | head -50 grep -oP 'src="[^"]+\.(jpg|png|webp)"' /tmp/estimate.html | sort -u | head -20 -
Service Area Pages
# City/service area pages often contain embedded Google Maps API keys curl -sk "https://$TARGET/service-areas" | grep -oP 'AIza[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{35,}' | head -5 curl -sk "https://$TARGET/service-areas" | grep -oP 'key=([^"& ]+)' | head -5 -
Customer Portal Probe
# Arborgold client portals curl -sk "https://client.$TARGET/" | head -20 curl -sk "https://$TARGET.arborgold.net/" | head -20 # Jobber client portal curl -sk "https://$TARGET.jobber.com/" | head -20
Attack Surface Signals
- URLs with
/estimate,/free-estimate,/request-quote,/service-areas - Google Maps API keys embedded in service-area or contact pages
- WordPress + third-party CRM/estimating plugins
- Before/after photo gallery pages with directory listing enabled
- Arborgold login page at
/arborgold/loginorclient/<company>.arborgold.net - Subdomains like
estimates.,portal.,schedule.,book.,client.
Common Root Causes
- CRM integration PII leakage — Estimate form submissions stored in plaintext or accessible via IDOR in CRM portals
- Google Maps API key over-exposure — Keys embedded on service-area pages without referrer restriction
- Outdated WordPress plugins — Tree service sites rarely update plugins; photo gallery and contact form plugins are common vulnerabilities
- Debug log exposure —
wp-content/debug.logwith form submissions, SQL queries, and API keys - Directory listing on uploads — Before/after photo galleries often leave directory listing enabled
Related Skills
- recon-landscaping — Overlapping sector (many companies do both tree and lawn services)
- recon-smb-services — General SMB recon methodology for local service businesses
- hunt-wordpress — WordPress-specific vulnerability hunting (dominant CMS for this sector)
- hunt-source-leak — API key and secret discovery in JS and config files
- hunt-file-upload — Photo gallery upload vulnerabilities
Bypass Techniques
- Arborgold client portals at
/arborgold/often have default credentials or no login required — try accessing directly - Google Maps API keys on service-area pages are frequently unrestricted — test key against Google Maps API without referrer
- Estimate form submissions are sometimes stored as PDFs in
/estimates/or/proposals/directories with sequential filenames - Free estimate forms that POST via AJAX may not have CSRF tokens — try direct POST from another origin
- CRM portal subdomains like
client.target.comorestimates.target.comoften have weaker auth than the main site - Photo galleries with numbered filenames (IMG_0001.jpg, IMG_0002.jpg) — iterate to find all photos including those not linked from pages
Real Examples
From cross-sector mass recon observation:
- A tree service company's Arborgold CRM portal at
/arborgold/was accessible without authentication, exposing all customer estimates including names, addresses, phone numbers, and tree service quotes - Another tree service had debug.log exposed at
/wp-content/debug.logcontaining 500+ form submissions with full customer PII — names, addresses, phone numbers, property descriptions - A tree removal company had a Google Maps API key on service-area pages that was unrestricted — any referrer could use it to query Google Maps API at $200/day cost to the business
- An arborist's Jobber client portal at
client.jobber.com/business-namehad weak authentication — iterating booking IDs returned customer service history