SuperAPI AI Directory

recon-salons

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Updated 10-16 06:43

About this skill

RECON-SALONS — Salon/Barbershop Recon

When to Use

Use when the target scope includes hair salons, barbershops, nail salons, spas, waxing studios, or med-spas. These businesses rely heavily on third-party booking platforms that handle customer PII (names, phone numbers, email addresses). The booking API exposure, customer data leakage, and authentication gaps are common findings in this sector.

Quick Reference

  • Common CMS: WordPress, custom PHP, Wix, Squarespace
  • Common platforms: Booksy, Vagaro, Square Appointments, Mindbody, Fresha, StyleSeat, Timely
  • Key endpoints: /book, /booking, /appointments, /services, /pricing, /staff
  • API surfaces: Booksy API, Vagaro API, Square API, Mindbody API v6
  • Key findings: Booking API exposing customer PII, appointment data without auth, staff schedule IDOR

Step-by-Step

  1. Booking Platform Fingerprinting

    # Booksy — look for booksy.com or booksy pages
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "booksy|book\.booksy\.com"
    # Vagaro — look for vagaro.com
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "vagaro"
    # Square Appointments — look for squareup.com or square.site
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "squareup|square\.site"
    # Fresha — look for fresha.com
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "fresha"
    # StyleSeat — look for styleseat.com
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "styleseat"
    
  2. Booking Page Recon

    # Find booking endpoints
    for path in "/book" "/booking" "/appointments" "/schedule" "/book-now" "/services" "/online-booking"; do
      code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
      [ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Booking: $path ($code)"
    done
    # Extract API endpoints from booking page
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/book" | grep -oE 'api[^"'"'"']*' | sort -u
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/book" | grep -oE 'https?://[^"'"'"']*/(api|v[0-9])[^"'"'"']*' | sort -u
    
  3. Customer Data Exposure Testing

    # Test booking API for customer data leakage
    for path in "/api/appointments" "/api/bookings" "/api/staff" "/api/customers" "/api/clients"; do
      curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" | jq '.' 2>/dev/null | head -10
      echo "---"
    done
    # IDOR on booking IDs
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/appointments/1" | jq '.' 2>/dev/null
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/bookings/2026/06/24" | jq '.' 2>/dev/null
    
  4. Third-Party Platform API Tests

    # Booksy — if embedded, try Booksy API endpoints
    curl -sk "https://book.booksy.com/api/v2/business/$BUSINESS_ID/appointments"
    # Vagaro API
    curl -sk "https://api.vagaro.com/v1/businesses/$BUSINESS_ID/appointments"
    # Square Appointments
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET.square.site/book" | grep -oE 'api[^"'"'"']*'
    
  5. Staff Schedule Recon

    # Staff profiles often list schedules without auth
    for path in "/staff" "/team" "/our-staff" "/stylists" "/barbers"; do
      curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" | grep -oE '[A-Z][a-z]+\s[A-Z][a-z]+' | sort -u | head -10
    done
    # Check for staff booking links (IDOR on staff IDs)
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/staff/1/schedule"
    curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/staff/1/bookings"
    

Attack Surface Signals

  • Embedded Booksy/Vagaro/Square booking widgets with API calls visible in network tab
  • book.booksy.com, vagaro.com, square.site subdomain redirects
  • Customer booking confirmation pages with PII in URL parameters
  • Staff profiles with embedded schedule availability (IDOR on staff IDs)
  • Testimonials/reviews with customer names, services, and dates
  • API keys for booking platforms in JS bundles

Common Root Causes

  1. Booking API without auth — Appointment data accessible with sequential IDs
  2. Customer PII in URLs — Booking confirmation pages with name/phone in query parameters
  3. Embedded API keys — Booksy/Vagaro/Square API keys in frontend code
  4. Staff schedule enumeration — Staff member IDs are sequential and schedules are public
  5. Review/testimonial PII — Customer names + service details in public gallery
  6. Cancellation/modification without auth — Booking changes via booking ID only

Related Skills

  • hunt-idor — Booking and customer IDOR is the primary finding in this sector
  • recon-gyms — Overlapping sector (many platforms used by both)
  • recon-smb-services — General SMB recon methodology
  • hunt-api-misconfig — Booking API and key exposure
  • hunt-source-leak — API keys in JS bundles

Bypass Techniques

  • Booking platforms often expose appointment data via API endpoints with sequential numeric IDs — try /api/appointments/1, /2, /3
  • Customer PII is frequently in URL parameters on booking confirmation pages — check for ?name=, ?phone=, ?email= in query strings
  • Staff schedule APIs may return data without any session cookie — test with empty Cookie: header
  • Some booking widgets pass business ID in a data-business-id attribute — this ID can be used to access other businesses' bookings
  • Cancellation endpoints often require only a booking ID (no auth) — test /api/bookings/{id}/cancel
  • Search for embedded API keys in JS bundles: grep -oP 'pk_(live|test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]{24,}' for Square/Stripe keys

Real Examples

From cross-sector mass recon observation:

  • A salon chain using Booksy had appointment data accessible at /api/v2/business/{id}/appointments — incrementing the business ID revealed booking data for 40+ other salons
  • A barbershop's Vagaro booking page passed customer full name and phone number in URL parameters on the confirmation page
  • A med-spa had a Square Appointments integration with the public API key hardcoded in JS, exposing all appointment data for the business
  • A nail salon's /api/staff endpoint returned all staff schedules without authentication, revealing working hours and personal contact info