When to Use
Use when the target scope includes property management companies, apartment rental agencies, real estate management firms, HOA management, or multi-family property group domains. These sites typically run WordPress on shared hosting with rental property listings (photos, floor plans, pricing, availability), tenant portals for maintenance requests and payments (storing PII including SSN on credit applications, bank account info for rent payment), and vacancy/availability data. Major PM software includes AppFolio, Buildium, Yardi, Entrata, ResMan, and Propertyware; but many smaller firms use WordPress with various plugins. Common vulnerabilities: tenant portal auth bypass, rent payment API exposure, maintenance request data leakage, and CORS credential reflection.
Quick Reference
for t in $(cat pm-targets.txt); do
echo "=== $t ==="
curl -skI "https://$t/" | grep -iE "wordpress|php|wp-"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com"
curl -skI "https://$t/wp-json/" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i "access-control"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/xmlrpc.php"
curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-content/debug.log"
echo "---"
done
Step-by-Step
Phase 1 — Domain Discovery
# Common patterns: <name>properties.com, <name>propertymanagement.com
# <name>apts.com, <name>rentals.com, <name>pm.com, <city>propertymgt.com
# <name>living.com, liveat<name>.com, <name>communities.com
# Find via crt.sh
curl -sk "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.$TARGET&output=json" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
domains = sorted(set(d['name_value'] for d in data))
for d in domains: print(d)
except: pass
" | tee pm-subdomains-$TARGET.txt
Phase 2 — Tenant Portal Recon (Highest Priority)
# Tenant portals contain: tenant PII, lease terms, payment history, maintenance records
for path in /portal /tenant /resident /login /my-account /account \
/pay-rent /online-rent /make-payment /maintenance-request /submit-request \
/tenant-portal /resident-portal; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null)
size=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null | wc -c)
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Tenant portal: $path (HTTP $code, ${size}b)"
done
# Check for tenant portal platform fingerprints
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "appfolio|buildium|yardi|entrata|resman|propertyware|tenantcloud" | head -10
Phase 3 — Property Listing & API Recon
# Property listing APIs often leak data without auth
for path in /properties /listings /rentals /apartments /available \
/api/properties /api/listings /wp-json/rentals/v1 /api/units \
/properties.json /listings.json; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null)
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Listings: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Test property API without auth
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/properties?limit=100" 2>/dev/null | jq '.' 2>/dev/null | head -50
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/properties.json" 2>/dev/null | jq '.' 2>/dev/null | head -50
Phase 4 — WordPress Standard Recon
# CORS credential reflection
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com"
# User enumeration
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" | jq '.[] | {id, name, slug, email}'
# REST API namespace enumeration
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
for ns in d.get('namespaces', []):
print(f' {ns}')
except: pass
"
# Debug log — may contain tenant application PII
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" -o /tmp/pm_debug.log 2>/dev/null
if [ -s /tmp/pm_debug.log ]; then
echo "[!!!] Debug log found ($(wc -c < /tmp/pm_debug.log) bytes)"
grep -oP 'SSN|social.security|bank.account|routing|credit.card|lease|rent|deposit' /tmp/pm_debug.log | sort -u | head -20
fi
# Directory listing on uploads
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(pdf|csv|xlsx|doc|docx)"' | head -20
Phase 5 — Maintenance Request Recon
# Maintenance request endpoints — may expose unit entry access codes, tenant contact info
for path in /maintenance /maintenance-request /service-request /work-order \
/repair /emergency-repair; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null)
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Maintenance: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
Phase 6 — Plugin Vulnerability Scan
for plugin in "elementor" "wordpress-seo" "contact-form-7" "gravityforms" \
"wpforms" "formidable" "fluentform" "woocommerce" "jetpack" \
"advanced-custom-fields" "estatik" "easy-property-listings" "wp-property"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET/wp-content/plugins/$plugin/readme.txt" 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$code" != "404" ] && [ -n "$code" ]; then
echo "[+] Plugin: $plugin (HTTP $code)"
fi
done
Attack Surface Signals
- CMS: WordPress (dominant), AppFolio/Buildium SaaS, custom PHP
- Hosting: Shared hosting, SaaS property management platforms
- Stack: PHP + MySQL, Tenant/resident portals, Rent payment integrations, Property listing APIs, Maintenance request systems
- Typical findings: CORS credential reflection, Debug log PII (SSN, bank account), Tenant portal auth bypass, Property API without auth, Directory listing with lease documents
Common Root Causes
- Tenant portal PII storage — lease agreements, credit applications with SSN, bank accounts for ACH stored in unprotected directories
- Debug log with financial data — rent payment transactions, tenant contact info, maintenance access codes logged by WP_DEBUG
- Property listing API without auth — rental data, floor plans, pricing, occupancy rates exposed without authentication
- Maintenance request access — work orders with tenant unit access codes (key codes, garage codes, gate codes) exposed
Related Skills
- recon-smb-services — broader SMB methodology
- hunt-wordpress — primary CMS for most PM sites
- hunt-cors — CORS credential reflection
- hunt-source-leak — debug.log, config exposure
- hunt-idor — sequential tenant IDs in portals
- hunt-file-upload — lease document upload features
- hunt-brute-force — weak tenant portal auth
Bypass Techniques
- Tenant portals often have IDOR on resident IDs — iterate
/portal/resident/1,/2,/3to find other tenants - Property listing APIs may accept
?per_page=500to dump full portfolio - Maintenance request endpoints may expose unit entry codes (garage codes, gate codes, lockbox combinations)
- Lease agreement PDFs are often named sequentially (
LEASE-2026-001.pdf,LEASE-2026-002.pdf) - Yardi/AppFolio portals sometimes have a
/docsor/filespath with uploaded lease documents accessible without auth
Real Examples
From a 20-target batch recon across US property management companies:
- A property management company had CORS credential reflection on the WP REST API users endpoint — tenant and property manager usernames exposed cross-origin
- An apartment community site had XMLRPC with system.multicall active — full brute-force amplification chain available
- A PM firm had debug.log exposed containing SQL queries with tenant lease information including monthly rent amounts, security deposit data, and tenant contact details
- A rental agency WordPress site had directory listing on
/wp-content/uploads/revealing signed lease agreement PDFs with tenant SSNs and bank account numbers for ACH payments