When to Use
Use when the target scope includes laundromat, dry cleaning, laundry delivery/pickup, or linen service company domains. These small local businesses typically have minimal-security web presences with online ordering, pricing calculators, and customer account portals. Common findings: exposed customer order data in debug logs, price calculator injection vulnerabilities, directory listing on uploaded receipts/invoices, and booking system CVEs.
Quick Reference
- Common CMS: WordPress (dominant), custom PHP, Wix, Squarespace
- Common platforms: Cents, LaundryLocker, Washlava, CleanCloud, Spynr, Laundroworks
- Key endpoints:
/order,/schedule-pickup,/menu,/pricing,/service-area,/track-order,/portal - Key findings: Debug log with customer PII, price calculator injection, directory listing of invoices/receipts, booking plugin vulnerabilities
Step-by-Step
-
CMS Detection
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "x-powered-by|set-cookie|server" curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "generator|wp-content|wp-json" -
Order/Pickup Booking Recon
for path in "/schedule-pickup" "/request-pickup" "/order" "/order-online" \ "/track" "/track-order" "/status" "/delivery" "/pricing" "/services"; do code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path") [ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Service endpoint: $path ($code)" done -
Customer Data Exposure
# Debug log — often contains customer orders with PII curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" | grep -iE "name|address|phone|order|pickup|delivery" | head -30 # Contact form submission storage for path in /wp-content/uploads/wpforms/ /wp-content/uploads/formidable/ \ /wp-content/uploads/cf7_uploads/; do body=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null) if echo "$body" | grep -q "Index of"; then echo "[!!!] DIR LISTING: $path" echo "$body" | grep -oP 'href="[^\"]+\.(csv|xlsx|txt|pdf)"' | head -20 fi done -
Price Calculator Probe
# Interactive pricing calculators often have injection potential curl -sk "https://$TARGET/pricing" | grep -oE 'name="[^"]*"' | sort -u curl -sk "https://$TARGET/api/calculate" -d "pounds=100&service=wash-fold" | jq '.' 2>/dev/null -
Third-Party Platform Detection
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -iE "cents|laundrylocker|washlava|cleancloud" | head -5
Attack Surface Signals
- URLs with
/schedule-pickup,/order-online,/pricing-calculator - WordPress + booking/customer portal plugins
- Third-party platform integrations (Cents, LaundryLocker)
- Customer order tracking pages with numeric IDs
- Price calculators with weight/item count inputs
Common Root Causes
- Customer order data in debug logs — every pickup/delivery order generates log entries with full PII
- Price calculator injection — PHP calculators with numeric inputs (pounds, items) often have no validation
- Third-party integration misconfig — API keys for payment/booking platforms exposed in JS bundles
- Invoice/receipt PDFs in public dirs — generated invoices with customer info stored in webroot
Related Skills
- recon-smb-services — General SMB recon methodology
- recon-pools — Similar booking/scheduling service profile
- hunt-wordpress — WordPress-specific vulnerability hunting
- hunt-source-leak — API key discovery in JS and config files
- hunt-source-leak — debug.log, invoice PDF exposure
Bypass Techniques
- Price calculator endpoints often accept POST data without server-side validation — test with negative quantities, decimal overflows, and special characters
- Order tracking at
/track-order?id=1often iterates sequential order IDs - Google Maps API keys on service-area pages frequently unrestricted
- Cents/LaundryLocker integrations may expose API tokens in page source