rails-webhooks

Rails Webhooks

Use for outbound/inbound webhook architecture and reliability. Modeled on Fizzy's event-driven webhook pipeline (with Campfire's simpler bot webhooks as contrast).

Delivery Model (outbox pattern)

• Domain events enqueue one dispatch job; the dispatch job fans out, creating one persisted Delivery row per webhook, each with a state enum (pending in_progress completed errored — string-backed via index_by(&:itself)).
• Each delivery row auto-enqueues its own send via after_create_commit :deliver_later — persist first, deliver second, so state survives crashes and retries.
• Fan-out is crash-safe with ActiveJob::Continuable: cursor over matching webhooks (find_each(start: step.cursor) + step.advance!) so a mid-batch crash resumes, not restarts.
• Record request metadata (headers, payload) and response (status, body) on the delivery row for audit/debugging. Cap stored/streamed response bodies (~100KB) with a running byte count.
• Use a dedicated webhooks queue so slow destinations can't starve other work.

Failure Classification (the key distinction)

• Expected destination failures (timeout, TLS, DNS, connection refused, HTTP 4xx/5xx): rescue, mark delivery completed with a symbolic error (response: { error: :connection_timeout }). The delivery ran; the destination failed. Do not retry the job.
• Unexpected exceptions (our bug): mark errored!, re-raise so ActiveJob retries.
• This split keeps retry behavior, dashboards, and delinquency tracking honest.

Delinquency Circuit Breaker

• Track consecutive failures + first_failure_at per webhook; auto-deactivate after N failures spanning a minimum window (Fizzy: 10 failures over 1+ hour).
• Reset the counter on success.
• Surface inactive state in the UI with a manual reactivation endpoint (resource :activation).

Security Baseline

• Treat webhook URLs as untrusted input; apply full SSRF protections (resolve + validate IP, block private ranges, pin IP, re-validate per redirect — see rails-security-multitenancy).
• Revalidate destination at send time, not just on create.
• Destination URL is immutable after create — updates permit name/subscriptions only. Retargeting requires a new webhook (and new secret).
• Sign payloads: HMAC signature header + timestamp header.
• Whitelist subscribable events at the model layer: normalizes :subscribed_actions, with: ->(v) { Array.wrap(v).map(&:to_s).uniq & PERMITTED_ACTIONS }.
• Require admin-level auth for webhook management endpoints.

Integration Adapters

• One delivery pipeline can serve multiple destination types: detect by URL pattern (for_slack?, for_campfire?), then vary content type, payload format (JSON/form/HTML), and rendering template per destination. Don't fork the delivery code per integration.
• Render payload URLs with tenant-correct script_name so links in payloads work.

Inbound Webhooks (receiving)

• Verify the signature first (construct_event-style), then re-fetch canonical state from the provider's API instead of trusting payload content or ordering.
• For chat-bot style callbacks: gate what responses can do by content type (only text/plain/text/html become replies), and prevent loops — never trigger a bot from its own messages.

Tenant Safety

• Keep webhook records and delivery queries tenant-scoped.
• Ensure event fan-out cannot leak cross-tenant data.

Operational Hygiene

• Recurring cleanup of old delivery records by retention policy (e.g. every 4 hours, delete_all on a stale scope).
• Surface delivery status/history in the webhook admin UI.
• Emit useful logs/metrics for success rate, retries, and latency.

Red Flags

• Fire-and-forget delivery with no persisted audit trail.
• Retrying destination failures the same way as code errors.
• Mutable webhook destination URLs.
• No circuit breaker — hammering dead endpoints forever.
• Unbounded reads of destination responses.
• No tenant scoping in delivery creation/lookup.
• No backpressure or queue isolation for high-volume events.