When to Activate
- Auditing or attacking GitHub Actions / GitLab CI / Jenkins pipelines for code execution
- Hunting
pull_request_target/workflow_run"pwn requests" and Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) - Assessing compromised third-party Actions, mutable version tags, and Actions cache poisoning
- Dependency confusion, typo/slopsquatting, and malicious package/install-hook payloads
- Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse and runner backdoors
- CI secret exfiltration and OIDC cloud-role (AWS/GCP/Azure) trust-policy abuse
- Validating SLSA build provenance and signing gates (defense / blue-team validation)
Technique Map
| Technique | ATT&CK | CWE | Reference | Script |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Pwn request (pull_request_target checkout of fork head) |
T1195.001 | CWE-269 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
Script injection (${{ github.event.* }} into run:) |
T1059 | CWE-94 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
| Direct / Indirect PPE (workflow or build-file modification) | T1195.001 | CWE-913 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
GitLab .gitlab-ci.yml poisoning / pipeline-as-user (CVE-2024-6678) |
T1648 | CWE-863 | references/pipeline-poisoning.md | scripts/workflow_auditor.py |
| Compromised Action via mutable tag (CVE-2025-30066 tj-actions) | T1195.001 | CWE-494 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Transitive Action compromise (CVE-2025-30154 reviewdog) | T1195.001 | CWE-1357 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Actions cache poisoning (cross-workflow escalation) | T1525 | CWE-349 | references/action-dependency-compromise.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Dependency confusion (internal name on public registry) | T1195.002 | CWE-427 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/dependency_confusion.py |
| Typo / slopsquatting + malicious install hook | T1195.002 | CWE-829 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/dependency_confusion.py |
| Self-replicating registry worm (Shai-Hulud npm) | T1195.002 | CWE-829 | references/package-registry-attacks.md | scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py |
| Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse & backdoor | T1199 | CWE-668 | references/runner-attacks.md | scripts/runner_recon.sh |
Jenkins Script Console RCE (/script, CVE-2024-23897) |
T1648 | CWE-306 | references/runner-attacks.md | scripts/runner_recon.sh |
CI secret exfiltration (toJSON(secrets), GhostAction) |
T1552.004 | CWE-522 | references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
OIDC trust-policy abuse (missing/* sub, wrong org wildcard) |
T1078.004 | CWE-1390 | references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md | scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py |
| Build provenance / signing gate validation (defense) | T1195 | CWE-347 | references/build-integrity-defense.md | scripts/provenance_verify.sh |
Quick Start
# 0. Recon: enumerate workflows, triggers, used actions across an org (read-only token)
gh repo list ORG --limit 1000 --json nameWithOwner -q '.[].nameWithOwner' > repos.txt
python3 scripts/workflow_auditor.py --repos repos.txt --token "$GH_TOKEN" --out findings.json
# 1. Static audit any cloned repo for pwn-requests + injection sinks (offline, no token)
git clone https://github.com/ORG/REPO && python3 scripts/workflow_auditor.py --path REPO
# 2. Flag risky/mutable third-party Action refs (unpinned tags = supply-chain exposure)
python3 scripts/malicious_action_scanner.py --path REPO --check-pins --check-known-bad
# 3. Dependency confusion: find internal names not registered on public registries
python3 scripts/dependency_confusion.py --manifest REPO/package.json --registry npm
python3 scripts/dependency_confusion.py --manifest REPO/requirements.txt --registry pypi
# 4. OIDC abuse: audit AWS IAM trust policies tied to GitHub's OIDC provider
python3 scripts/oidc_trust_auditor.py --provider github --cloud aws --profile target
# 5. Runner recon (run ON a compromised self-hosted runner during an engagement)
bash scripts/runner_recon.sh
# 6. Defensive validation: verify SLSA provenance + cosign signature before promote
bash scripts/provenance_verify.sh --image ghcr.io/org/app:tag --repo org/app
Recommended OSS tooling: gato-x (offensive GHA enumeration/PPE), zizmor/octoscan/poutine/raven
(static workflow analysis), step-security/harden-runner (egress control), cosign+slsa-verifier (gates).
OPSEC & Detection (summary)
| Technique | Telemetry / IOC | Detection (Sigma/EDR) | OPSEC note |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pwn request / PPE | Fork PR triggering privileged run; new .github/workflows/* in PR; outbound to non-allowlisted host |
GH audit log workflows; Sigma on runner egress to new domains; zizmor in CI |
Payload runs in build log; public-repo logs are world-readable — assume detection |
| Compromised Action / mutable tag | Action ref resolves to new SHA; tag force-push event; base64 in action source | Diff resolved SHA vs lockfile; alert on tag re-point in audit log | Tag re-point is logged org-side; SHA-pin victims are immune |
| Cache poisoning | Cache key written by read-only/low-priv job, restored by release job | Monitor actions/cache save/restore key ownership; provenance mismatch |
Survives across workflows; harder to attribute than direct edit |
| Dependency confusion | Install-time outbound from build host; package version anomaly (very high ver) | EDR proc-tree npm/pip -> curl/node -e; registry telemetry |
Higher public version wins resolver; noisy if scoped registries enforced |
| Registry worm (Shai-Hulud) | bundle.js postinstall; trufflehog filesystem /; public Shai-Hulud repo; shai-hulud-workflow.yml |
EDR: npm child spawns trufflehog/git push; Sigma on workflow file creation | Self-propagating = loud and fast; burns the maintainer token |
| Runner backdoor | Rogue runner registration; persistent proc on host; outbound only to github.com | Runner-host EDR; GH audit self_hosted_runner events; one-job-per-runner |
Traffic blends with github.com; non-ephemeral = persistence |
Secret exfil / toJSON(secrets) |
${{ toJSON(secrets) }} in run step; POST of base64 to webhook |
Static scan for toJSON(secrets); egress allowlist |
GitHub masks *** in logs — encoding evades the mask |
| OIDC trust abuse | AssumeRoleWithWebIdentity; CloudTrail userName = repo:org/repo:ref |
CloudTrail filter on federated principals; IAM Access Analyzer external findings | Short-lived creds, attributed to repo in logs; AWS blocks new bad policies (Jun 2025) |
Deep Dives
- references/pipeline-poisoning.md — Pwn requests, PPE (direct/indirect), script injection, GitLab/Jenkins pipeline poisoning, with vulnerable+fixed YAML and a working exploit PR payload.
- references/action-dependency-compromise.md — Third-party Action compromise, mutable git tags, the tj-actions (CVE-2025-30066) / reviewdog (CVE-2025-30154) chain, and Actions cache poisoning; SHA-pinning detection.
- references/package-registry-attacks.md — Dependency confusion, typo/slopsquatting, malicious install hooks, and the Shai-Hulud self-replicating npm worm with concrete IOCs.
- references/runner-attacks.md — Self-hosted / non-ephemeral runner abuse, JIT/ephemeral hardening, runner backdoors, and Jenkins Script Console RCE.
- references/secrets-oidc-abuse.md — CI secret enumeration/exfiltration (GhostAction),
toJSON(secrets), and AWS/GCP/Azure OIDC trust-policy misconfigurations. - references/build-integrity-defense.md — SLSA provenance, in-toto attestations, Sigstore/cosign keyless signing, slsa-verifier gates, and admission-control enforcement (the defensive counterweight).