Every Capsem VM session produces a ledger in its session directory:
~/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/ for an ephemeral VM, ~/.capsem/run/persistent/<name>/
for a named one. The ledger is two files that only make sense together:
session.db-- SQLite, every telemetry table plus the index of captured bodies.session.bodies-- the append-only body archive: HTTP, model, tool, exec and security payloads, deflated in blocks of about 1 MiB. SQLite never holds body bytes.
Copy, fork or delete them as a pair; either one alone is useless. A global
~/.capsem/sessions/main.db aggregates stats across sessions.
The session ledger has no migrations. A session.db written by an older build
fails to open, loudly and by name, rather than being upgraded in place.
Session identity invariant
<id> is the opaque VM/session id used for route paths, DB-handle keys,
session-directory names, CAPSEM_VM_ID, and UI tab routing. Human names such
as co-work1 or code-vm1 are display aliases only and must live in name
fields. User surfaces may accept a name (capsem resume co-work1), but they
must translate it to the VM id before calling /vms/{id}/.... Never use a
persistent registry name as SandboxInfo.id, never look up telemetry routes
with registry.get(&id) unless the id has first been resolved to the registry
key, and never key session_db_handles by display name.
If a UI shows telemetry for the wrong provider/model, check this boundary
first: /vms/list and /vms/{id}/info must expose id = session id and
name = display name, and /vms/{id}/stats/detail must open the DB under the
resolved session directory for that id. A session named co-work1 showing
another session's ollama rows while its own DB has AGY/Google rows is a route
identity bug until proven otherwise.
Quick inspection
Listing sessions
Python here means the build-system environment:
uv run --project build_system --frozen python ... (a bare python3 may be a
system interpreter without the packages these need).
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py # Recent sessions
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py -n 20 # Show more
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-model # Only sessions with AI model calls
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-db # Only sessions whose ledger is still on disk
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-net # Only sessions with network events
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-tools # Only sessions with tool calls
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --min-cost 0.01 # Only sessions that cost money
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-db --with-model # Combine filters
Output columns: ID, Created (MM-DD HH:MM:SS), Duration, Cost, net events, tokens (in+out), tool calls, fs events. Sessions with * after the ID still have a session.db on disk (queryable).
Stats come from the main.db rollup, so they're available after the session directory is gone.
Deep inspection
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py # Full integrity check on latest session
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py <id> # Specific session or named VM
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py --db path/session.db # A ledger file directly
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py --verify-bodies # Also read every body back through its hash
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py -n 10 # Show 10 preview rows per table
Checks: SQLite page integrity (PRAGMA quick_check, first -- a damaged file
ends the report), table existence, row counts, body archive integrity (below),
file-monitor overflow windows, tool lifecycle integrity (orphaned
tool_calls/tool_responses), AI provider correlation (net_events vs
model_calls), and NULL detection in critical fields. It exits 1 when the
ledger is damaged.
Route readiness (DbHandle::ready) checks the schema's shape only, once per
schema_version, and never scans pages: that scan cost 1.8 s per failed poll
on a million-row ledger (google/capsem#230). Page damage surfaces as a
malformed error on the query that reads it, at the ledger copy's
quick_check, and here.
The body archive check compares the index with the file without trusting
either: every event_body_blobs.block_offset exists in body_blocks; every
body_offset + body_len fits in its block's raw_len; session.bodies is at
least as long as the largest block_offset + disk_len (a block's committed
extent, headers included) and starts with the archive's file header.
--verify-bodies then reads every body, inflating each segment once, and
checks it against body_hash.
Session database tables (session.db)
The model/tool contract is intentionally one ledger:
model_callsis one row per model exchange: request sent to the provider and response received from it.model_itemsis the ordered item ledger for request, reasoning/thinking, response, tool_call, and tool_response content inside those exchanges.tool_callsis the canonical user/security tool-call ledger for all origins (native,mcp,builtin,local). User-facing tool counts and CEL tool evidence come from this table.tool_responsesrecords tool result content sent back to a model. A response row must match atool_calls.call_idin the same trace.- MCP protocol facts are typed security events. MCP-origin
tools/callactivity must appear intool_callswithorigin = 'mcp'. - One
model_calls.idcan emit manytool_calls.call_idvalues. The tool response must reuse the samecall_id; MCP can enrich that same logical call, but it does not create a second product ledger.
Identity Graph
Use this graph when correlating model, tool, and security rows:
flowchart TD
Session["session_id<br/>one Capsem session database"]
Trace["trace_id<br/>causal runtime chain"]
Turn["turn_id<br/>one user-visible agent turn<br/>user input + all resulting work"]
ModelA["model_call_id A = model_calls.id<br/>one provider exchange<br/>one request + one response"]
ModelB["model_call_id B = model_calls.id<br/>later provider exchange<br/>same user-visible turn"]
ModelAItems["model_items for model_call_id A<br/>request, reasoning, response, tool_call"]
ModelBItems["model_items for model_call_id B<br/>tool_response input, request, reasoning, response"]
ToolA1["tool_call_id A1 = tool_calls.call_id<br/>logical tool invocation"]
ToolA2["tool_call_id A2 = tool_calls.call_id<br/>logical tool invocation"]
ToolA1Response["tool_responses.call_id = A1<br/>same tool_call_id"]
ToolA2Response["tool_responses.call_id = A2<br/>same tool_call_id"]
McpFacts["MCP transport facts<br/>origin/type enrichment<br/>same tool_call_id, no duplicate ledger"]
EventRows["event_id rows<br/>http, dns, model, tool, file, process, credential, security"]
BodyBlobs["event_body_blobs<br/>index by event_id into session.bodies"]
SecurityRows["security_rule_events<br/>rule matches by event_id"]
ProviderIds["provider response_id / message_id / transport ids<br/>metadata only"]
Session --> Trace
Trace --> Turn
Turn -->|"contains 1..N"| ModelA
Turn -->|"contains 1..N"| ModelB
ModelA -->|"owns ordered rows"| ModelAItems
ModelB -->|"owns ordered rows"| ModelBItems
ModelA -->|"emits 0..N"| ToolA1
ModelA -->|"emits 0..N"| ToolA2
ToolA1 -->|"response reuses id"| ToolA1Response
ToolA2 -->|"response reuses id"| ToolA2Response
McpFacts -.->|"enriches"| ToolA1
McpFacts -.->|"enriches"| ToolA2
ToolA1Response -->|"can feed later exchange"| ModelB
ToolA2Response -->|"can feed later exchange"| ModelB
Trace --> EventRows
Turn --> EventRows
ModelA --> EventRows
ModelB --> EventRows
ToolA1 --> EventRows
ToolA2 --> EventRows
EventRows --> BodyBlobs
EventRows --> SecurityRows
ModelA -.-> ProviderIds
ModelB -.-> ProviderIds
Definitions:
event_ididentifies one emitted ledger event row. Security rows, body blobs, and event detail routes join back through this id.trace_idgroups runtime work caused by one causal operation across tables: HTTP, DNS, model, tool, file, process, credentials, and security.turn_idgroups all work caused by one user-visible agent turn: the user's input, every provider exchange needed to answer it, every tool request and response, and every emitted HTTP/DNS/file/process/security row caused by it.model_call_idis themodel_calls.idvalue for exactly one provider request/response exchange inside a turn. It owns that exchange's request, reasoning/thinking, response, model-emitted tool-call items, token counts, and provider metadata. It is not the whole user turn; a singleturn_idcan contain multiplemodel_call_idvalues.tool_call_ididentifies one logical tool invocation across model-native tools, MCP transport, Capsem built-ins, and local tools. In SQLite it is stored astool_calls.call_idandtool_responses.call_id.
Provider response ids, message ids, and transport request ids are provider or transport metadata. They are not Capsem's join contract.
One turn_id is the user-input scope. It can contain multiple
model_call_id values when an agent calls the model, executes tools, then calls
the model again with tool results. One model_call_id is one provider-exchange
scope and carries that exchange's request, reasoning/thinking, response, token
counts, and ordered model_items. It can emit zero or more tool_call_id
values; this is the canonical one-to-many relationship for model-visible tools.
Stated as the debugging invariant: one model_call_id can emit N
tool_call_id values, and each emitted tool response must reuse that
tool_call_id.
A tool response must carry the same tool_call_id as the tool request.
MCP is not a second user-facing tool ledger. MCP-origin tools/call activity
must resolve to a tool_calls row with origin = 'mcp' or enrich an existing
logical tool_call_id. An MCP call observed without a corresponding logical
tool call is an integrity/security finding, not a separate product counter.
Key cardinalities:
- One session has many
trace_idvalues. - One
trace_idhas one or moreturn_idvalues. - One
turn_idhas one or moremodel_call_idvalues. - One
model_call_idhas one provider request and one provider response. - One
model_call_idhas manymodel_itemsrows: request, reasoning, response, tool_call, and tool_response items in observed order. - One
model_call_idcan emit manytool_call_idvalues. - One
tool_call_idhas one tool request and zero or more observed response rows, all with the sametool_call_id. - One
event_ididentifies one emitted row and joins its security, body, and display details.
net_events -- one row per HTTP request through MITM proxy
CREATE TABLE net_events (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL, -- RFC 3339
domain TEXT NOT NULL, -- "api.anthropic.com"
port INTEGER DEFAULT 443,
decision TEXT NOT NULL, -- "allowed" or "denied"
process_name TEXT, -- "claude", "node", "python3"
pid INTEGER,
method TEXT, -- "POST", "GET"
path TEXT, -- "/v1/messages"
query TEXT, -- URL query string
status_code INTEGER, -- 200, 403, etc.
bytes_sent INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
bytes_received INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
duration_ms INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
matched_rule TEXT, -- which policy rule matched
request_headers TEXT, -- JSON (allowlisted verbatim, others hashed)
response_headers TEXT,
request_body_preview TEXT, -- compact display field only
response_body_preview TEXT,
conn_type TEXT DEFAULT 'https'
);
model_calls -- one row per AI API request+response cycle
CREATE TABLE model_calls (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL,
provider TEXT NOT NULL, -- "anthropic", "openai", "google"
model TEXT, -- "claude-sonnet-4-20250514", "gpt-4o"
process_name TEXT,
pid INTEGER,
method TEXT NOT NULL, -- "POST"
path TEXT NOT NULL, -- "/v1/messages"
stream INTEGER DEFAULT 0, -- 1 if SSE streaming
system_prompt_preview TEXT,
messages_count INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
tools_count INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
request_bytes INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
request_body_preview TEXT, -- compact display field only
message_id TEXT, -- "msg_..." (Anthropic), "chatcmpl-..." (OpenAI)
status_code INTEGER,
text_content TEXT, -- full response text
thinking_content TEXT, -- thinking/reasoning text
stop_reason TEXT, -- "end_turn", "tool_use", "stop", "STOP"
input_tokens INTEGER,
output_tokens INTEGER,
duration_ms INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
response_bytes INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
estimated_cost_usd REAL DEFAULT 0,
trace_id TEXT, -- groups tool call chains across turns
usage_details TEXT -- JSON: {"cache_read": N, "thinking": N}
);
Only emitted for actual LLM API paths (/v1/messages, /v1/chat/completions, /v1beta/models/*/). Health checks, auth endpoints don't create rows.
tool_calls -- canonical tool invocation ledger
CREATE TABLE tool_calls (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL, -- 12 hex chars
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL,
model_call_id INTEGER, -- model_calls.id that emitted the tool call when model-visible
provider TEXT NOT NULL,
status TEXT NOT NULL, -- "requested", "observed", "responded", "error"
call_index INTEGER NOT NULL, -- position in response
call_id TEXT NOT NULL, -- "toolu_..." (Anthropic), "call_..." (OpenAI)
tool_name TEXT NOT NULL,
arguments TEXT, -- JSON string
response_preview TEXT,
origin TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'native', -- "native", "mcp", "builtin", or "local"
server_name TEXT,
method TEXT,
request_id TEXT,
decision TEXT NOT NULL,
duration_ms INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
error_message TEXT,
process_name TEXT,
bytes_sent INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
bytes_received INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
policy_mode TEXT,
policy_action TEXT,
policy_rule TEXT,
policy_reason TEXT,
trace_id TEXT,
credential_ref TEXT
);
For model-emitted tool calls, model_call_id points to the model exchange
whose response emitted that tool call. It is not a trace-level guess.
tool_responses -- results sent back for tool calls
CREATE TABLE tool_responses (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
model_call_id INTEGER NOT NULL, -- model_calls.id whose request consumed the tool result
call_id TEXT NOT NULL, -- matches tool_calls.call_id
content_preview TEXT,
is_error INTEGER DEFAULT 0,
trace_id TEXT,
credential_ref TEXT
);
tool_responses.model_call_id points to the later model exchange that carried
the tool result back to the model. The same call_id must match a
tool_calls.call_id in the same trace.
MCP initialize/list/resource protocol evidence is in the forensic payload of
the matching security_rule_events row. That payload is archive-backed, not a
column: read it with
DbHandle::read_body(event_id, "security_rule_events", BodyDirection::Payload),
or join event_body_blobs on source_table = 'security_rule_events' and
direction = 'payload' to see what is stored. Decisions and asks archive the
same way under security_decision_events and security_ask_events, and all
three name the same event, so a payload read always names its table. Use
tool_calls for product/user/security tool activity.
Bodies: event_body_blobs, body_blocks and session.bodies
Full bodies -- HTTP and model requests and responses, tool results, exec
stdout/stderr, security rule payloads -- live in session.bodies, not in
SQLite. session.db holds the index:
CREATE TABLE body_blocks ( -- one row per archive block, upserted per segment
block_offset INTEGER PRIMARY KEY, -- byte offset of the block header in session.bodies
raw_len INTEGER NOT NULL, -- inflated size of the committed segments
disk_len INTEGER NOT NULL, -- committed extent in the file, headers included
sealed_at TEXT NOT NULL -- when the last segment was written; retention cuts by this
);
CREATE TABLE event_body_blobs ( -- one row per archived body; no bytes
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
event_id TEXT NOT NULL, -- 12 hex, the row in source_table
event_type TEXT NOT NULL,
source_table TEXT NOT NULL, -- net_events, model_calls, tool_calls, tool_responses,
-- exec_events, security_rule_events
direction TEXT NOT NULL, -- request, response, payload, stdout, stderr
content_type TEXT,
original_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL, -- what the boundary saw
stored_bytes INTEGER NOT NULL, -- what was archived (10 MiB cap per direction)
truncated INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 1 when stored_bytes < original_bytes
body_hash TEXT NOT NULL, -- blake3 of the ARCHIVED bytes
block_offset INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES body_blocks(block_offset),
body_offset INTEGER NOT NULL, -- start inside the block's inflated bytes
body_len INTEGER NOT NULL, -- always = stored_bytes
trace_id TEXT, turn_id TEXT, created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
UNIQUE(event_id, source_table, direction)
);
A body is found by one index lookup, one seek, one inflate of its block and a
slice. Every read verifies the block's own blake3 and then the body's
body_hash; bytes that do not match the row that named them are refused, never
served. There is no body column any more: SQL tells you what was captured
and how big it was, not the bytes.
To get the bytes:
- In Rust,
DbHandle::read_body(event_id, source_table, direction)for one body andDbHandle::read_bodies(event_id)for every body of an event (read_bodies_for_eventsfor a page, with a byte budget). Route and helper code never opens the archive itself. - Over HTTP,
GET /vms/{id}/bodies/{event_id}returns every body of one event, 1 MiB each by default (?max_bytes=up to 16 MiB).truncatedsays the capture was cut;truncated_for_transportsays this response was. - The whole session as a WARC 1.1 file:
GET /vms/{id}/bodies/export.warc.gz. Oneresourcerecord per body, idurn:capsem:{session}:{source_table}:{event_id}:{direction}, bracketed by twowarcinforecords; the closing one counts skipped bodies by reason, and a file without it is an export that did not finish. Readable bywarcio/pywbwith no Capsem code. - Offline, from a copy of a session:
tests/helpers/body_archive.py(the one allowlisted Python reader of the format).
Preview columns (*_preview) are compact display copies for list views. They
are not the forensic source of truth: when a preview and the archive disagree,
the archive is the ledger.
Retention (vm.resources.retention_days, default 30): at service start,
failed-session directories older than the period are deleted; when a
persistent VM stops, blocks sealed before the cutoff are dropped, the archive
is compacted and the index rows are rewritten. Ephemeral sessions are deleted
whole and never trimmed.
Guest exec output is archived exactly, per lane, up to 10 MiB each, for
buffered and streamed execs; stdout_bytes/stderr_bytes are the true totals
and a body shorter than them is marked truncated (google/capsem#230). Before
#230 the ledger archived the 1 KiB preview, so an older ledger's exec bodies
are 1 KiB excerpts.
fs_events -- filesystem changes in guest workspace
CREATE TABLE fs_events (
id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
timestamp TEXT NOT NULL,
action TEXT NOT NULL, -- "created", "modified", "deleted", "overflow"
path TEXT NOT NULL, -- relative to workspace root
size INTEGER, -- bytes (NULL for deletes and dirs)
kind TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'file' -- "file", "dir", "symlink", "other"
);
kind says what the path is. Security rules read it as file.kind, and a
directory event reports no size (the directory inode's size is not a file
size). A symlink is recorded as a symlink and never followed or descended.
An overflow row names no path: it is the marker the monitor writes when one
scan produced more changes than it emits in a single window. The events it
stands for are not lost -- the baseline is rewound so the next scan derives
them again -- and size carries how many were held back. A gap in the record
is evidence, so it is a row rather than a log line.
Every path under the workspace is recorded, directories included. There is no
exclusion list: .git/hooks, .git/config, node_modules, .venv and
target are where a compromise persists, so a ledger that omitted them read as
a clean session for a backdoored workspace. Cost is paid by the monitor's
adaptive poll interval (poll_interval_for_scan in
crates/capsem-core/src/fs_monitor.rs: ten scan-durations, floored at 500ms and
capped at 10s), never by dropping events. tests/citadel/test_fs_monitor_has_no_exclusions.py
holds the rule.
Main database (main.db)
Global rollup at ~/.capsem/sessions/main.db. Key tables:
- sessions -- one row per session: id, mode, status, timestamps, aggregated counts (total_requests, allowed/denied, tokens, cost, tool_calls, file_events)
- ai_usage -- per-session per-provider aggregates (call_count, tokens, cost, duration)
- tool_usage -- per-session per-tool aggregates from the canonical tool ledger
- mcp_usage -- per-session MCP transport aggregates when protocol frames are visible
Rollup happens when a session ends.
Common debugging scenarios
Missing net_events
- Guest didn't make HTTPS requests, or VM shut down before proxy flushed
- Check:
just exec 'curl -s https://api.anthropic.com/ && sleep 1'then inspect
model_calls has NULL model or NULL tokens
- Gzip bug: response was gzip-compressed and proxy didn't decompress before SSE parsing. Check if
Accept-Encoding: gzipwas sent andContent-Encoding: gzipwas in response. - Non-streaming: for non-streaming responses, tokens come from response JSON, not SSE. Check if
stream=0. - Provider mismatch: check if the URL path was detected as the right provider. Model resolution: request body > SSE stream > response JSON > URL path.
tool_calls without matching tool_responses
- The model invoked a tool but the next turn's tool results weren't captured
- Check if the VM session ended before the tool result was sent back
python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.pyreports orphaned tool_calls automatically
Empty fs_events
- The host file monitor (
crates/capsem-core/src/fs_monitor.rs) polls the VirtioFS workspace; there is no guest watcher. Check the process log for the monitor starting on the session's workspace directory. - The VM stopped before the next scan. The interval adapts to scan cost (500ms to 10s), so a write in the last second before shutdown may not have been seen.
A file event seems late or missing
- Look for
action = 'overflow'rows: one scan saw more changes than a window emits and held the rest for the next scan.sizeis how many were held.check_session.pyreports them. - Nothing under the workspace is excluded. If
.git/,node_modules/ortargetpaths are absent, the monitor did not see them; it did not filter them.
Bodies missing
- Check
body_blocksfirst. No rows means no block was ever sealed: the session stored no bodies, or the archive writer was disabled at open. - An index row that names a block past the end of
session.bodiesis refused at open by design: the writer stores no further bodies for that session and logssession body index names bytes past the end of the archive, and the stale rows fail their hash check rather than answer with another block's bytes. It means the index and the file no longer describe the same archive, most likely a crash during retention compaction, orsession.dbcopied without itssession.bodies. check_session.py --verify-bodiesnames every row that does not read back.- A persistent VM trims bodies older than
vm.resources.retention_dayswhen it stops; a body older than that is gone by design, and its index row with it. - Exec output past 10 MiB per lane is cut before the ledger sees it; a body
with
truncated = 1and a largerstdout_bytesis that, not archive damage. Ledgers written before google/capsem#230 hold 1 KiB exec excerpts.
Empty tool_calls
- No AI agent invoked tools during the session, or model/MCP tool evidence failed to parse.
- User-facing tool activity must be in
tool_callsregardless of whether the origin is native model output, MCP, builtin, or local.
Empty MCP-origin tool_calls
- No visible MCP
tools/callactivity was observed, or the guest MCP endpoint was not started. - This can be valid for direct model-native tool calls. Check native
tool_callsbefore assuming no user tool activity happened.
Cost is zero
- Model not found in pricing table (
config/data/genai-prices.json) - Download the reviewed upstream pricing JSON and invoke
python3 build_system/scripts/build/update_genai_prices.py <source.json> config/data/genai-prices.json.
When to inspect sessions
Always run python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/check_session.py after changes to:
- Guest MCP endpoint (tool routing, policy, response format)
- MITM proxy (SSE parsing, body preview, Content-Encoding)
- File monitor (VirtioFS poll loop, kinds, overflow windows)
- Body archive or its index (
session.bodies,event_body_blobs,body_blocks, retention) -- add--verify-bodies - Telemetry pipeline (model_calls extraction, tool_calls, cost)
The inspect output now includes a tool usage breakdown from tool_calls plus MCP transport evidence when present. Check it after MCP changes to verify user tools return allowed with reasonable latency and that MCP-origin rows link back to protocol evidence when available.
Ad-hoc SQL queries
Use sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" to run SQL against a session DB (a named VM's is under run/persistent/<name>/). Open it read-only (-readonly) while the VM runs: the owning capsem-process is the only writer. SQL answers what was captured and where; the bytes of a body are in session.bodies (see Bodies above).
# Decisions breakdown
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT decision, COUNT(*) FROM net_events GROUP BY decision"
# Token totals by provider
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT provider, SUM(input_tokens) as in_tok, SUM(output_tokens) as out_tok, SUM(estimated_cost_usd) as cost FROM model_calls GROUP BY provider"
# Find orphaned tool calls
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT tc.call_id, tc.tool_name FROM tool_calls tc LEFT JOIN tool_responses tr ON tc.call_id = tr.call_id WHERE tr.id IS NULL"
# MCP-origin user tool usage breakdown (http, external servers, etc.)
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT tool_name, decision, COUNT(*) as cnt, ROUND(AVG(duration_ms),1) as avg_ms FROM tool_calls WHERE origin = 'mcp' AND tool_name IS NOT NULL GROUP BY tool_name, decision ORDER BY cnt DESC"
# MCP-origin tool usage breakdown
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT method, tool_name, decision, COUNT(*) as cnt FROM tool_calls WHERE origin = 'mcp' GROUP BY method, tool_name, decision ORDER BY cnt DESC"
# Check fs_events actions
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT action, COUNT(*) FROM fs_events GROUP BY action"
# Trace a tool call chain
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT id, model, stop_reason, trace_id FROM model_calls WHERE trace_id = '<trace_id>' ORDER BY timestamp"
# What bodies an event has, and how big they were
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT source_table, direction, content_type, original_bytes, stored_bytes, truncated FROM event_body_blobs WHERE event_id = '<event_id>'"
# Archive health at a glance: blocks, bytes, and any body pointing at an unrecorded block
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT COUNT(*), SUM(raw_len), SUM(disk_len), MIN(sealed_at) FROM body_blocks; SELECT COUNT(*) FROM event_body_blobs b LEFT JOIN body_blocks k USING (block_offset) WHERE k.block_offset IS NULL"
# File-monitor overflow windows and what kinds of paths changed
sqlite3 "$HOME/.capsem/run/sessions/<id>/session.db" "SELECT kind, action, COUNT(*) FROM fs_events GROUP BY kind, action"
Tip: use python3 build_system/scripts/doctor/list_sessions.py --with-db --with-model to find sessions worth querying.