Purpose
The skill examines whether a takeover project triggers a mandatory offer under Sections 35, 29 WpÜG , dimensions the minimum price under Section 31 WpÜG in conjunction with the WpÜG-AngVO, assists with the offer document and its BaFin review (Sections 11, 14) as well as with the statement of the target company (Section 27 WpÜG). It addresses the prohibition of defensive measures without shareholder meeting authorization (Section 33), possible exemption provisions (Section 37 WpÜG in conjunction with the WpÜG-BefreiV) as well as the squeeze-out (Sections 39a/39b) from a 95% voting rights share.
Inputs
- Target company (registered office in Germany; listed within the meaning of Section 2 III WpÜG; trading on the regulated market or organized market within the meaning of Section 2 VII WpÜG)
- Bidder (person, legal form, current shareholding, group structure)
- Acquisition project (share purchase agreement, block trade, voting agreement, anchor investor agreement)
- Voting rights share before and projected after completion
- Parties involved (acting-in-concert candidates: co-investors, shareholders acting in concert)
- Prior acquisitions in the last 6 months (minimum price calculation Section 4 WpÜG-AngVO)
- Objective of the mandate: bidder advice / target company advice / exemption application / squeeze-out
Sub-agent architecture
Researcher provides WpÜG norms, WpÜG-AngVO, WpÜG-BefreiV, BGH/OLG Frankfurt case law (WpÜG Senate), BaFin administrative practice. Drafter prepares an offer document outline and, if applicable, an exemption application in the bidder mandate, and a Section 27 statement in the target mandate. Reviewer checks mandatory offer thresholds, minimum price calculation and the deadline calendar.
Procedure
1. Scope of application (Sections 1, 2 WpÜG)
The WpÜG applies to offers to acquire securities of a target company (registered office in Germany; shares admitted to trading on an organized market within the meaning of Section 2 VII WpÜG — regulated market in Germany or another EEA state). Three types of offers:
| Type | Norm |
|---|---|
| Voluntary acquisition offer | Sections 10 et seq. WpÜG |
| Takeover offer (aim: control) | Sections 29 et seq. WpÜG |
| Mandatory offer (after acquisition of control) | Sections 35 et seq. WpÜG |
2. Control and mandatory offer (Sections 29 II, 35 WpÜG)
Control = holding at least 30% of the voting rights in the target company (Section 29 II WpÜG).
Consequence of the acquisition of control:
- Publication of the acquisition of control within 7 calendar days (Section 35 I 1 WpÜG).
- Submission of the offer document to BaFin within 4 weeks after publication (Section 35 II 1 WpÜG).
3. Acting in concert / attribution (Section 30 WpÜG)
The following are attributed in the calculation of voting rights:
| Section 30 I No. | Attribution circumstance |
|---|---|
| 1 | Subsidiaries within the meaning of Section 290 HGB |
| 2 | Trustee |
| 3 | Pledged shares (pledgee) |
| 4 | Usufruct |
| 5 | Acquisition right from options |
| 6 | Deposited / custodied shares |
Section 30 II WpÜG (Acting in concert): Shares of third parties are attributed if the bidder coordinates with them regarding the exercise of voting rights or in another manner, in order to bring about a change in the strategic direction of the target company. Individual cases: voting agreements, consortium agreements, investor agreements with specific strategic requirements. Pure ad hoc arrangements (e.g. a one-off voting agreement on a general meeting item) are not sufficient according to the BGH (BGH, WMF, judgment of 18.09.2006 – II ZR 137/05 [unverifiziert]; BGH, Postbank, judgment of 29.07.2014 – II ZR 353/12 [unverifiziert]).
4. Offer document and BaFin review (Sections 11, 14 WpÜG)
- Section 11 WpÜG: Mandatory disclosures — bidder, target company, consideration, minimum price calculation, acceptance period, conditions, financing confirmation (Section 13 WpÜG), bidder's intentions regarding business policy / employees / registered office (Section 11 II No. 2 WpÜG).
- Section 14 II WpÜG: BaFin reviews within 10 business days of receipt; in the event of objections, prohibition or request for subsequent submission. After a positive review, publication of the offer document without undue delay and commencement of the acceptance period.
5. Minimum price (Section 31 WpÜG in conjunction with WpÜG-AngVO)
In the case of mandatory and takeover offers, the consideration must correspond at least to the higher of the following two amounts:
| Section WpÜG-AngVO | Basis |
|---|---|
| Section 4 (pre-acquisition price) | Highest price paid by the bidder (or parties acting in concert with it) within the last 6 months before publication of the offer decision |
| Section 5 (weighted average price) | 3-month average price before publication pursuant to Section 35 I or Section 10 I WpÜG (in the case of a mandatory offer: reference date Section 35 I), weighted by turnover |
At least 5% of the consideration must be provided in cash (EUR) if the bidder has acquired shares for cash in the last 6 months (Section 31 III WpÜG).
Subsequent acquisitions (Section 31 IV WpÜG): If, after publication, the bidder acquires within 1 year shares at a higher price after expiry of the acceptance period, he owes the difference to the accepting shareholders.
6. Acceptance period (Section 16 WpÜG)
- Section 16 I WpÜG: Acceptance period 4 to 10 weeks after publication of the offer document.
- Section 16 II WpÜG (additional acceptance period): After announcement of the acceptance level, a further acceptance period of 2 weeks runs for shareholders who have not yet accepted.
- Extension in the case of a competing offer (Section 22 WpÜG) or in the case of an amendment to the offer (Section 21 III WpÜG).
7. Conduct obligations of the target company (Sections 27, 33 WpÜG)
- Section 27 WpÜG (statement): The management board and supervisory board of the target company shall, promptly after transmission of the offer document, issue a reasoned statement on the offer. Content pursuant to Section 27 I 2: type and amount of consideration, expected consequences for the company/employees/sites, intentions of the bidder, own interests of the management board/supervisory board.
- Section 33 WpÜG (prohibition of defensive measures): After publication of the decision to make an offer and until publication of the result, the management board of the target company may not take any measures that could prevent the success of the offer, except
- measures of proper management
- with the consent of the supervisory board or by authorization of the shareholders' meeting (Section 33 II), or
- search for competing bidders (white knight).
8. Exemption (Section 37 WpÜG in conjunction with WpÜG-BefreiV)
Application by the bidder to BaFin before obtaining control or promptly thereafter. Grounds in particular Section 9 WpÜG-BefreiV: intra-group restructuring, restructuring cases, acquisition by a trustee, inheritance. BaFin decides at its discretion.
9. Squeeze-out and put right (Sections 39a, 39b WpÜG)
- Section 39a WpÜG: A bidder who, following a takeover offer, holds at least 95% of the voting shares may, within 3 months after expiry of the acceptance period, apply to the Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main for transfer of the remaining shares. Standard: the offer price is deemed appropriate if the bidder has reached an acceptance rate of at least 90% (Section 39a III 3 WpÜG).
- Section 39b WpÜG: Remaining shareholders may demand tender under the same threshold (95%).
- Alternatively: squeeze-out under stock corporation law pursuant to Sections 327a–327f AktG (threshold 95%, cash compensation subject to judicial review).
Sources and citation style
Binding: ../../../references/zitierweise.md.
Statutes
- WpÜG – Sections 10–14, 16, 21, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39a, 39b
- WpÜG-AngVO – Sections 4 (pre-acquisition price), 5 (average price)
- WpÜG-BefreiV – grounds for exemption
- §§ 21–23 AktG (notification obligations – coordinated with WpHG § 33)
- §§ 327a–327f AktG (squeeze-out under stock corporation law)
Commentaries
- Angerer/Geibel/Süßmann, WpÜG, 4th ed. 2022, §§ 29, 30, 31, 35.
- Steinmeyer, WpÜG, 4th ed. 2019, §§ 29 et seq.
- Schwark/Zimmer, KapMRK, 5th ed. 2020, §§ 29 et seq. WpÜG.
- Krause/Pötzsch, in: Assmann/Pötzsch/Schneider, WpÜG, 4th ed. 2024, § 30 marginal no. 1 et seq.
Case law ([unverifiziert – prüfen in juris/BaFin-Website/BGH])
- BGH, judgment of 18.09.2006 – II ZR 137/05, BGHZ 169, 98 (WMF – Acting in concert)
- BGH, judgment of 29.07.2014 – II ZR 353/12, ZIP 2014, 1932 (Postbank takeover – minimum price and attribution)
- OLG Frankfurt (WpÜG Senate), various orders on exemption applications and minimum price
- BaFin administrative practice on § 37 WpÜG / WpÜG-BefreiV
Output format
GUTACHTEN — WpÜG Pflicht-/Übernahmeangebot
Zielgesellschaft: <anonymisiert> | Bieter: <anonymisiert>
I. Sachverhalt (knapp)
II. Frage(n)
III. Kurzantwort
– Pflichtangebot ausgelöst: [ja / nein / nur bei Acting in concert]
– Mindestpreis: <EUR pro Aktie>
– Empfehlung: [Angebotsunterlage / Befreiungsantrag § 37 / keine Maßnahme]
IV. Rechtliche Bewertung
1. Anwendungsbereich WpÜG (§§ 1, 2)
2. Kontrollschwelle § 29 II WpÜG
a) Direkter Stimmrechtserwerb
b) Zurechnung § 30 I WpÜG
c) Acting in concert § 30 II WpÜG (WMF/Postbank-Linie)
3. Veröffentlichungspflicht § 35 WpÜG
4. Angebotsunterlage §§ 11, 14 — BaFin-Prüfung 10 WT
5. Mindestpreis § 31 WpÜG iVm §§ 4, 5 WpÜG-AngVO
a) Vorerwerbe (6 Monate)
b) 3-Monats-Durchschnittskurs
c) Geldleistung 5 % (§ 31 III)
d) Nacherwerbe (§ 31 IV, 1 Jahr)
6. Annahmefrist § 16 (4–10 Wo + Zaunkönig 2 Wo)
7. Verhaltenspflichten Zielgesellschaft §§ 27, 33
8. Befreiungstatbestände § 37 WpÜG / WpÜG-BefreiV
9. Squeeze-out § 39a (95 %)
V. Entwurf Pflichtangebot-Skizze / § 27-Stellungnahme (optional)
VI. Fristtabelle
- Veröffentlichung Kontrollerwerb: 7 Kalendertage (§ 35 I 1)
- Übermittlung Angebotsunterlage: 4 Wochen (§ 35 II 1)
- BaFin-Prüfung: 10 Werktage (§ 14 II)
- Annahmefrist: 4–10 Wochen (§ 16 I)
- Zaunkönig-Frist: + 2 Wochen (§ 16 II)
- Nacherwerb-Differenz: 1 Jahr ab Ende Annahmefrist (§ 31 IV)
- Squeeze-out-Antrag: 3 Monate (§ 39a)
VII. Risiken / offene Punkte
🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴 <Einstufung mit Begründung>
VIII. Quellenverzeichnis
Risks / typical mistakes
- Acting-in-concert attribution underestimated: a voting agreement + coordinated action on corporate policy is sufficient; even multiple individual arrangements can, based on the overall picture, establish a concert (Postbank line).
- Minimum price set too low because prior acquisitions by group-affiliated acquirers outside the bidder's camp were overlooked — § 31 in conjunction with § 30 WpÜG.
- Circumvention of the mandatory offer without an exemption application (§ 37 WpÜG) — BLOCKER: sanction and civil-law consequences (loss of voting rights § 59 WpÜG).
- Infringement of § 33: the management board of the target company takes defensive measures (e.g. sale of crown jewels, capital increase) without shareholder meeting authorization or supervisory board approval.
- Statement under § 27 without disclosure of own interests (management board/supervisory board holdings, remuneration packages on a change of control) — mandatory content under § 27 I 2 no. 4.
- Squeeze-out threshold (95%) not reached — tender right under § 39b not activated; alternatively squeeze-out under stock corporation law §§ 327a et seq. AktG with appraisal proceedings.
- Confusion of WpHG voting rights notification ↔ WpÜG control: WpHG thresholds (3/5/10/15/20/25/30/50/75%) are purely transparency obligations, while the WpÜG 30% threshold triggers a substantive offer obligation.