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Skillswphg-marktmissbrauch

wphg-marktmissbrauch

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Updated 10-16 09:53

About this skill

/kapitalmarktrecht:wphg-marktmissbrauch

Purpose

The skill examines the central market abuse offences under the Market Abuse Regulation (Regulation (EU) 596/2014 — MAR), in particular the prohibition of insider dealing (Art. 14 MAR), the prohibition of market manipulation (Art. 15 MAR), the ad-hoc disclosure obligation (Art. 17 MAR) including the self-deferral under Art. 17 IV, the obligation to maintain an insider list (Art. 18 MAR) and the notification obligation for transactions by managers (Directors' Dealings, Art. 19 MAR). It clarifies the sanction consequences under Art. 30 MAR as well as §§ 119, 38 WpHG.

Inputs

  • Issuer (usually a listed AG / SE) and ISIN / trading venue (regulated market within the meaning of § 32 BörsG, open market, MTF)
  • concrete information / project (M&A, restructuring, financial figures, change of management board, regulatory proceedings)
  • Status of the information (negotiation stage, term sheet, LOI, conclusion of contract, closing)
  • known group of persons (management board, supervisory board, advisers) and, if applicable, existing insider list
  • Purpose of the inquiry: preventive compliance advice, deferral decision, response to BaFin proceedings, defence against investor claims

Sub-agent architecture

The researcher supplies MAR articles, WpHG sanction provisions, CJEU case law (Geltl/Daimler on "precise information" in multi-stage processes, Lafonta on price relevance), BGH case law (IKB, EM.TV) and the BaFin issuer guideline. The drafter examines in the style of a legal assessment, and if necessary drafts the ad-hoc announcement and the deferral documentation. The reviewer checks whether the deferral under Art. 17 IV is documented and whether the insider list has been addressed.

Process

1. Scope of application (Art. 2 MAR)

MAR applies to financial instruments that are admitted to trading on a regulated market (Art. 4 I No. 21 MiFID II) or for which an application has been made, as well as to financial instruments traded on an MTF/OTF (Art. 2 I MAR). In the case of a pure open market outside an MTF (open market in the narrow sense), application must be examined on a case-by-case basis.

2. Inside information (Art. 7 MAR) – four criteria

Criterion Content
Precise Concrete circumstance that has occurred or with regard to which it can be assumed with sufficient probability that it will occur (Art. 7 II MAR; CJEU, Geltl/Daimler, Case C-19/11 [unverifiziert])
Not public Information is (still) not accessible to the general investing public
Direct/indirect reference Reference to one or more issuers or one or more financial instruments
Price-relevant Likely, if made public, to have a significant effect on the price ("reasonable investor" standard; CJEU, Lafonta, Case C-628/13 [unverifiziert] — indication of direction not required)

Intermediate steps in protracted matters (negotiation stages of an M&A transaction) can already constitute inside information if the individual intermediate step itself fulfils the four criteria (Geltl line).

3. Prohibition of insider dealing (Art. 14 in conjunction with Art. 8 MAR)

Prohibited: (a) acquisition/disposal using inside information for one's own or a third party's account; (b) recommending or inducing third parties; (c) unlawful disclosure (Art. 10 MAR).

Legitimate Behaviour (Art. 9 MAR): Certain conduct is expressly not insider dealing, namely transactions based on a plan drawn up and documented before obtaining the inside information (Art. 9 III) as well as the classic M&A acquisition process (Art. 9 IV: transactions to carry out a takeover-related acquisition, the inside information of which consists precisely in the takeover itself — so-called front running in the context of one's own takeover remains permitted, provided the Art. 9 IV requirements are met).

4. Prohibition of market manipulation (Art. 15 in conjunction with Art. 12 MAR)

Three main offences: trade-based manipulation (Art. 12 I lit. a, b), information-based manipulation (Art. 12 I lit. c — false or misleading signals), manipulation through benchmarks (Art. 12 I lit. d). Practical examples: pump-and-dump, wash trades, spoofing, targeted press releases without any factual basis.

5. Ad-hoc disclosure obligation (Art. 17 MAR)

  • Art. 17 I MAR: The issuer discloses without delay inside information that directly concerns it. "Without delay" = without culpable delay, in BaFin practice as a rule within hours, in complex matters a narrow processing buffer.

  • Art. 17 IV MAR (self-deferral): Deferral on one's own responsibility is permissible if cumulatively:

    1. Legitimate interest of the issuer (e.g. ongoing negotiations whose outcome would be jeopardised by immediate publication — ESMA Guidelines on Delay of Disclosure of Inside Information).
    2. Deferral is likely not to be suitable for misleading the public (no contradiction to statements already published).
    3. Confidentiality of the inside information is ensured (insider list, need-to-know distribution list).

    After publication, BaFin must be informed of the deferral and its reasons pursuant to Art. 17 IV subpara. 3 MAR.

  • Documentation of the deferral is mandatory (Art. 4 I Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1055): time at which the inside information arose, time of the deferral decision, responsible persons, ongoing confidentiality control.

6. Insider list (Art. 18 MAR)

The issuer (and persons acting on its behalf) keeps an insider list of all persons who have access to inside information. Format pursuant to Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/347. Updating without delay in the event of a change of person or status. Retention for at least 5 years after creation/updating.

7. Directors' Dealings (Art. 19 MAR)

Managers (management board, supervisory board and persons "closely associated" with them within the meaning of Art. 3 I No. 26 MAR) report own transactions involving shares/debt instruments of the issuer or related derivatives within 3 business days to the issuer and BaFin (Art. 19 I MAR) as soon as a threshold of EUR 5,000/calendar year has been exceeded (Art. 19 VIII MAR; increase possible through national option in the WpHG Facilitation Ordinance). Publication by the issuer without undue delay.

Closed periods (Art. 19 XI MAR): 30 calendar days before publication of the half-year or annual financial report, managers are in principle prohibited from carrying out own transactions — exceptions under Art. 19 XII MAR (exceptional circumstances, predetermined programmes).

8. Sanctions

Provision Sanction
Art. 30 MAR + § 120 WpHG Administrative sanction: natural persons up to EUR 5 million or three times the profit; legal persons up to EUR 15 million / 15 % of annual group turnover
§ 119 WpHG Administrative offence (fine)
§ 38 WpHG Criminal provision insider trading / manipulation – imprisonment up to 5 years (qualified under § 38 V WpHG)
§§ 826, 823 II BGB in conjunction with § 38 WpHG / Art. 17 MAR Investor damages – BGH line IKB, EM.TV [unverifiziert]
BaFin naming and shaming, Art. 34 MAR Publication of the sanction on bafin.de

9. Criminal law threshold § 38 WpHG

According to BGH case law, the criminal sanction requires an economic advantage or a significant transaction volume; in the case of minor infringements, it remains an administrative offence under § 119 WpHG. In the mandate: carefully examine the subjective elements (intent / recklessness).

Sources and citation style

Binding: ../../../references/zitierweise.md.

Directly applicable Union law

  • Regulation (EU) 596/2014 (MAR) – Art. 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 23, 30, 34
  • Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1055 (delay documentation)
  • Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/347 (insider list)
  • ESMA Guidelines on Delay of Disclosure of Inside Information (MAR/2016/1478)

German law

Commentaries

  • Klöhn, in: Klöhn, MAR, 1st ed. 2018, Art. 7 marginal no. 1 et seq.; Art. 17 marginal no. 1 et seq.
  • Mülbert/Sajnovits, in: Assmann/Schneider/Mülbert, WpHG/MAR, 8th ed. 2024, Art. 7 MAR marginal no. 1 et seq.
  • Pawlik, in: KapMRK (Schwark/Zimmer), 5th ed. 2020, Art. 17 MAR marginal no. 1 et seq.
  • Just, in: Just/Voß/Ritz/Becker, WpHG, 1st ed. 2015, § 38 marginal no. 1 et seq.

Case law ([unverifiziert – prüfen in curia.europa.eu / juris / bafin.de])

  1. CJEU, judgment of 28.06.2012 – Case C-19/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:397 (Geltl/Daimler – precise information in intermediate steps)
  2. CJEU, judgment of 11.03.2015 – Case C-628/13, ECLI:EU:C:2015:162 (Lafonta – indication of direction not required)
  3. BGH, judgment of 13.12.2011 – XI ZR 51/10, BGHZ 192, 90 (IKB – investor damages ad hoc)
  4. BGH, judgment of 19.07.2004 – II ZR 217/03, BGHZ 160, 134 (EM.TV)
  5. BaFin sanction decisions – published on bafin.de (naming and shaming Art. 34 MAR)

Output format

GUTACHTEN — Marktmissbrauch MAR / WpHG
Emittent: <anonymisiert>  |  Vorgang: <M&A / Restrukturierung / Bilanz / …>

I. Sachverhalt (knapp)
II. Frage(n)
III. Kurzantwort
     – Insiderinformation: [ja / nein / Zwischenschritt]
     – Ad-hoc-Pflicht: [unverzüglich / Aufschub Art. 17 IV zulässig]
     – Empfehlung: [Veröffentlichung / Aufschub mit Doku / Handelsverbot]

IV. Rechtliche Bewertung
    1. Anwendungsbereich MAR (Art. 2)
    2. Insiderinformation (Art. 7) – vier Kriterien
    3. Verbote (Art. 14, 15) – ggf. Legitimate Behaviour (Art. 9)
    4. Ad-hoc-Pflicht (Art. 17 I) und Aufschub (Art. 17 IV)
    5. Insiderliste (Art. 18) – Pflichten Emittent
    6. Directors' Dealings (Art. 19) – Closed Period
    7. Sanktionsrisiko (Art. 30 MAR, §§ 119, 38 WpHG)

V. Fristtabelle
   - Ad-hoc unverzüglich               (Art. 17 I MAR)
   - Aufschub-Doku + BaFin-Mitteilung  (Art. 17 IV MAR + DVO 2016/1055)
   - Directors' Dealings 3 Geschäftstage (Art. 19 I MAR)
   - Insiderliste Aktualisierung unverzüglich (Art. 18)

VI. Risiken / offene Punkte
    🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴 <Einstufung mit Begründung>

VII. Entwurf Ad-hoc-Mitteilung (optional)
     [sachliche Pressemitteilungs-Form, faktentreu, keine Werbung]

VIII. Quellenverzeichnis

Risks / typical errors

  • Deferral Art. 17 IV without documentation of the three conditions — BLOCKER, infringement leads to fines and investor litigation exposure.
  • Insider list not updated, when new advisors are involved — infringement of Art. 18 MAR.
  • Closed period overlooked, because a management board member relies on a "predetermined plan" whose conditions are not met under Art. 19 XII MAR.
  • Intermediate-step inside information underestimated (Geltl line) — as soon as a term sheet/LOI exists, a publication obligation may already arise if the step itself is price-relevant.
  • Market manipulation risk in press releases without sufficient factual basis — Art. 15 in conjunction with Art. 12 I lit. c MAR.
  • Self-assessment without insider check in urgent matters (management board purchases before financial statements publication) — BLOCKER.
  • Banking supervisory law level (KWG authorization for securities services) not here — cross-reference plugin bankrecht.