kartellverbot-pruefung

/kartellrecht:kartellverbot-pruefung

Purpose

The skill examines whether an agreement, a decision by an association of undertakings or a concerted practice infringes the cartel prohibition of § 1 GWB or Art. 101 I TFEU, and whether a safe harbour (De Minimis Notice; Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720; R&D Block Exemption Regulation 2023/1066; Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation) or the individual exemption of § 2 GWB / Art. 101 III TFEU applies. It addresses the civil-law consequences (nullity under § 134 BGB in conjunction with § 1 GWB), the fine risk under §§ 81 et seq. GWB and private damages liability under §§ 33 et seq. GWB.

Inputs

Contract text or description of the arrangement / conduct (horizontal vs. vertical)
Participating undertakings, their activity and their market shares on the affected markets
Interstate element (cross-border effect within the meaning of Art. 101 TFEU)
Existence of any hardcore restrictions (price, market, quantity, customer, bid-rigging, absolute territorial protection)
In the case of a plea for individual exemption: efficiency gains, consumer participation, indispensability, residual competition

Sub-agent architecture

Researcher provides § 1, § 2 GWB, Art. 101 TFEU, Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720, R&D/Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation 2023, De Minimis Notice, relevant leading CJEU decisions (STM, Allianz Hungária, Cartes Bancaires, Generics, Coty), case law of the BGH Cartel Senate and commentary references (Immenga/Mestmäcker, Langen/Bunte). Drafter carries out the four-stage subsumption (elements of the offence → appreciability/de minimis → block exemption safe harbour → individual exemption). Reviewer checks hardcore identification, the block exemption market share threshold and the completeness of the four cumulative conditions of Art. 101 III TFEU / § 2 GWB.

Procedure

1. Scope of application

§ 1 GWB: agreement/decision/concerted practice with a restriction of competition in Germany.
Art. 101 TFEU: additionally capability of affecting interstate trade. Where there is an interstate element, Art. 3 Regulation 1/2003 applies: national authorities must apply Art. 101 and may not be stricter with regard to agreements.

2. Elements of the offence

Concept of an undertaking: any entity carrying on an economic activity (functional, group-wide — "single economic entity"; purely intra-group agreements are not covered).
Agreement / decision / concerted practice — distinction from unilateral conduct (Art. 102) is essential.
Restriction of competition:
- Restriction by object ("by object"): empirical presumption of anti-competitive effect; in particular hardcore (price-fixing, market/customer allocation, quantity quotas, bid-rigging, absolute territorial protection). No effects analysis required (CJEU, Cartes Bancaires, C-67/13 P: narrow interpretation; Generics, C-307/18: Pay-for-Delay as purpose).
- Effects-based restriction ("by effect"): market analysis with a counterfactual scenario.
Appreciability: Commission De Minimis Notice (OJ 2014 C 291/1):
- horizontal: combined market share ≤ 10 %;
- vertical: in each case ≤ 15 %;
- but never in the case of hardcore restrictions.

3. Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720 safe harbour

A vertical agreement within the meaning of Art. 1 lit. a of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation is exempted if:

market share of each party on the relevant market ≤ 30 % (Art. 3);
no hardcore restriction under Art. 4 (resale price maintenance, absolute territorial protection with exceptions, restriction of active/passive sales to end consumers, prohibitions specific to selective distribution);
non-exempted restrictions under Art. 5 (non-compete obligations > 5 years, post-contractual non-compete obligations > 1 year, brand exclusion provisions in selective distribution) are separately void, but the remainder of the contract remains valid.

Special issues:

Online sales restrictions: blanket prohibition of third-party platforms — only possible in luxury selective distribution (CJEU, Coty, C-230/16);
Dual distribution (manufacturer sells itself via its own channels): exchange of information governed by Art. 2 IV–V;
Most-favoured-customer/best-price clauses: narrow parity clauses permissible, broad ones prohibited (Art. 5 I lit. d).

Other relevant block exemption regulations:

R&D Block Exemption Regulation 2023/1066 (safe harbour for R&D cooperation; market share threshold 25 % horizontal);
Specialisation Block Exemption Regulation 2023/1067;
Technology Transfer Block Exemption Regulation 316/2014.

4. Individual exemption § 2 GWB / Art. 101 III TFEU

Four cumulative requirements (self-assessment — legal exception system since Regulation 1/2003):

Efficiency gains (objectively measurable — cost reduction, innovation, quality);
fair share for consumers (passing on to consumers / purchasers);
Indispensability of the restriction (no less restrictive means);
no elimination of substantial competition.

In the case of hardcore restrictions: no individual exemption is realistic.

5. Legal consequences

Civil-law nullity (§ 134 BGB in conjunction with § 1 GWB; Art. 101 II TFEU) of the anticompetitive clause; remainder of the contract § 139 BGB.
Fine §§ 81, 81c GWB / Art. 23 Regulation 1/2003: up to 10 % of worldwide group turnover.
Leniency programme §§ 81h–81n GWB (implemented from ECN+ Directive 2019/1).
Private damages §§ 33–33h GWB (binding effect of final authority decision § 33b GWB; passing-on § 33e GWB; limitation § 33h: 5 years from knowledge / absolute 10 years, suspension by administrative proceedings).
Competition Register §§ 1 et seq. WRegG: Registration can lead to exclusion from public contracts.

Sources and Citation Style

Binding: ../../../references/zitierweise.md.

Statutes and Secondary Legislation

§ 1 GWB (prohibition of cartels)
§ 2 GWB (individual exemption — reference to Art. 101 III TFEU)
§ 134 BGB (statutory prohibition — nullity)
§§ 33–33h GWB (private enforcement, binding effect, passing-on, limitation period)
§ 81 GWB (range of fines)
Art. 101 TFEU
Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 (enforcement)
Regulation (EU) 2022/720 (Vertical Block Exemption Regulation)
Regulation (EU) 2023/1066 (R&D Block Exemption Regulation)
COM, De Minimis Notice, OJ 2014 C 291/1
COM, Vertical Guidelines 2022, OJ 2022 C 248/1
Directive (EU) 2014/104 (antitrust damages)

Commentaries

Roth/Ackermann, in: Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht, status 2024, § 1 GWB marginal no. 1 et seq.
Zimmer, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, 6th ed. 2020, § 1 marginal no. 1 et seq.
Ellger, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, EU-Wettbewerbsrecht, 6th ed. 2019, Art. 101 III TFEU marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert – Auflagenstand]
Bunte, in: Langen/Bunte, Kartellrecht Vol. 1, 14th ed. 2022, § 1 GWB marginal no. 1 et seq. [unverifiziert – Auflagenstand]

Case Law (`[unverifiziert – prüfen in juris/EuGH-Datenbank]`)

ECJ, judgment of 30.06.1966 – Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (distinction between object and effect)
ECJ, judgment of 11.09.2014 – C-67/13 P, Cartes Bancaires (narrow interpretation of restriction by object)
ECJ, judgment of 30.01.2020 – C-307/18, Generics and Others (pay-for-delay as object)
ECJ, judgment of 14.03.2013 – C-32/11, Allianz Hungária (context-related assessment)
ECJ, judgment of 06.12.2017 – C-230/16, Coty Germany (third-party platforms in luxury selective distribution)
BGH, judgment of 12.07.2016 – KZR 25/14, Lottoblock II (vertical restrictions)
BGH, judgment of 28.06.2011 – KZR 75/10, ORWI (passing-on, § 33e GWB)
BKartA, fine proceedings truck cartel, sugar, beer, sausage (annual activity report)

Output Format

GUTACHTEN – Kartellverbots-Prüfung § 1 GWB / Art. 101 AEUV
Vereinbarung: <Bezeichnung>
Stand: <Datum>

I. Sachverhalt (Vereinbarung, Parteien, Marktanteile, Zwischenstaatlichkeit)
II. Frage(n)
III. Kurzantwort (1 Satz)

IV. Rechtliche Bewertung
    1. Anwendungsbereich (§ 1 GWB / Art. 101 AEUV — Zwischenstaatlichkeit)
    2. Tatbestand
       a) Unternehmen
       b) Vereinbarung / Beschluss / abgestimmtes Verhalten
       c) Wettbewerbsbeschränkung
          aa) Zweckbeschränkung (Hardcore-Check)
          bb) ggf. Wirkungsbeschränkung
       d) Spürbarkeit (De-minimis)
    3. Sicherheitshafen
       a) Vertikal-GVO 2022/720 (Marktanteilsschwelle, Kernbeschränkungen Art. 4, Art. 5)
       b) ggf. FuE-GVO / Spezialisierungs-GVO / TT-GVO
    4. Einzelausnahme § 2 GWB / Art. 101 III AEUV
       a) Effizienzgewinn
       b) Verbraucherbeteiligung
       c) Unerlässlichkeit
       d) kein Restwettbewerbsausschluss
    5. Rechtsfolgen
       - Nichtigkeit § 134 BGB
       - Bußgeld § 81 GWB / Art. 23 VO 1/2003
       - Schadensersatz §§ 33 ff. GWB
       - Wettbewerbsregister

V. Risikoeinstufung
   🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴 <Einstufung mit Begründung>

VI. Empfehlung
    - Vertragsänderung (konkrete Klausel)
    - Kronzeugen-Antrag bei laufendem Kartell?
    - Compliance-Schulung

VII. Quellenverzeichnis

Example (excerpt, legal opinion style)

The clause "The dealer undertakes not to undercut the manufacturer's non-binding recommended prices" constitutes resale price maintenance This is a hardcore restriction within the meaning of Art. 4(a) of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation 2022/720; it is to be classified as a restriction by object within the meaning of § 1 GWB and Art. 101 I TFEU (cf. ECJ, Cartes Bancaires, C-67/13 P). Reliance on the safe harbour of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation is precluded (Art. 4 at the end). An appreciability assessment is unnecessary, since the Commission's De Minimis Notice does not apply to hardcore restrictions (OJ 2014 C 291/1 para. 13). The individual exemption under § 2 GWB / Art. 101 III TFEU regularly fails due to the indispensability: Vertical price fixing is not necessary to achieve efficiency gains; milder means (recommended retail price without a sanctions mechanism) are sufficient. The clause is therefore, pursuant to Section 134 of the German Civil Code (BGB) in conjunction with Section 1 of the Act Against Restraints of Competition (GWB), void. ...

Risks / typical mistakes

Hardcore restriction declared as a "recommendation", but in fact backed by sanctions — is taken up by the Bundeskartellamt.
Market share threshold of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation (30%) calculated incorrectly — on the relevant market and for each party individually.
Article 4 of the Vertical Block Exemption Regulation versus Article 5: Hardcore restrictions contaminate the entire contract; Article 5 restrictions are only partially void.
Online restrictions underestimated (third-party platform bans, price parity clauses).
Individual exemption as a blanket plea — all four conditions are cumulative and must be specifically substantiated.
Interstate effect misjudged — primacy of application of Article 101 TFEU and binding effect of European Commission decisions.
Statute of limitations under Section 33h GWB overlooked in follow-on proceedings (5 years from knowledge / 10 years absolute).
Binding effect under Section 33b GWB ignored: a final Bundeskartellamt/European Commission decision is binding in damages proceedings.