Purpose
Before a planned merger, the skill clarifies whether a merger control notification obligation exists — under German law with the Bundeskartellamt (§§ 35–43 GWB) or primarily with the EU Commission under the EU Merger Regulation 139/2004 (one-stop shop). It provides a draft notification and a risk memo on the substantive prohibition review and on the standstill obligation. Closing before clearance is punishable by a fine under § 81 II GWB of up to 10% of worldwide group turnover — gun-jumping is the central blocker.
Inputs
- Transaction structure (share acquisition / asset acquisition / joint control / joint venture)
- Participating undertakings and group affiliation (affiliated undertakings § 36 II GWB)
- Most recently completed financial years — worldwide turnover, EU turnover, domestic turnover (at least 3 years)
- Purchase price / value of the consideration (for § 35 Ia GWB transaction value threshold)
- Planned signing and closing date
- Markets / areas of activity of the parties (horizontal / vertical / conglomerate overlap)
- For JV: full-function/partial-function character; joint venture agreements
Sub-agent architecture
Researcher provides the relevant GWB and EU Merger Regulation provisions, BKartA decision practice (e.g. on thresholds, transaction value, full-function JV), ECJ/General Court decisions on market definition and prohibition practice, as well as commentary references. Drafter prepares a draft notification (parties, transaction, turnover, markets, substantive assessment) and a risk memo with prohibition probability and remedies options. Reviewer checks the threshold calculation, one-stop-shop allocation, deadline calendar and gun-jumping risk.
Process
1. Merger constituent element § 37 GWB / Art. 3 EU Merger Regulation
A merger exists (§ 37 I GWB) in the case of:
- Acquisition of the assets of another undertaking in whole or in a substantial part,
- Acquisition of direct or indirect control within the meaning of § 37 I No. 2 GWB,
- Acquisition of shares which alone or together with other shares already held by the acquirer 25 % or 50 % of the capital or of the voting rights,
- any other combination of undertakings as a result of which one or more undertakings can exercise a competitively significant influence on another undertaking directly or indirectly.
Under EU law this corresponds to Art. 3 EU Merger Regulation (acquisition of control, full-function JV). Joint control (50/50 JV) is a merger; the full-function criterion (operating independently on a lasting basis on the market) applies under the EU Merger Regulation and in the practice of the BKartA.
2. Thresholds § 35 GWB
The notification obligation applies only if the participating undertakings in the last financial year cumulatively reached (§ 35 I GWB):
- worldwide turnover of all participating undertakings together > EUR 500 million, and
- domestic turnover of one participating undertaking > EUR 50 million, and
- domestic turnover of another participating undertaking > EUR 17.5 million.
Transaction value threshold Section 35 Ia GWB: If the domestic turnover thresholds are not met, the concentration is nevertheless notifiable if
- worldwide turnover of all parties > EUR 500 million,
- one participating undertaking has domestic turnover > EUR 50 million,
- the value of the consideration > EUR 400 million, and
- the target undertaking is significantly active in Germany (domestic nexus — BKartA/BMWK 2018 guidance, as updated).
De minimis clause Section 36 II GWB: no prohibition if the market is small and the dominated undertaking is small; the connecting clause Section 38 GWB governs the turnover calculation for affiliated undertakings.
3. Primacy of the EU Merger Regulation (one-stop shop, Art. 21 EUMR)
If the EU thresholds under Art. 1 EUMR are met (basic rule: worldwide > EUR 5 billion + two parties each > EUR 250 million Union; or the EUR 2 billion variant with the additional multi-state requirement and the two-thirds rule), exclusively the European Commission has jurisdiction. A German notification is not required; where applicable, examine referral under Art. 4 IV / 9 (to a Member State) or Art. 4 V / 22 (to the Commission).
4. Notification Section 39 GWB
The undertakings participating in the concentration are subject to the notification obligation. Notification before completion, in writing or electronically, in German, with the minimum information (Section 39 III GWB): parties, owners/group affiliation, market position (market shares, as a rule ≥ 5 % or value information), turnovers, if applicable supplementary competition analysis. Form CO under the EU Merger Regulation for EU notifications.
5. Time limits Section 40 GWB / Art. 10 EUMR
Preliminary review (Section 40 I GWB): 1 month from complete notification. If BKartA does not open main examination proceedings before the deadline expires, the concentration is deemed cleared (tacit clearance).
Main examination (Section 40 II GWB): 4 months from notification, extendable (e.g. by 1 month in the case of commitments under subsection 2 sentence 4, by crediting foreign proceedings under subsection 2 sentences 5 et seq.).
EU Merger Regulation: Phase I 25 working days (Art. 10 I), Phase II 90 working days (Art. 10 III), extension in the case of commitments + 10 / + 20 working days.
6. Prohibition of completion Section 41 GWB / Art. 7 EUMR
Completion before clearance is prohibited. Infringement: fine of up to 10 % of the worldwide group turnover of the penultimate financial year (Section 81 II GWB; Art. 14 EUMR). The concept of completion is broad (also partial completion, staff integration, exchange of information without a clean team — "gun-jumping"). Suspensive ineffectiveness of the completion measures under Section 41 I 2 GWB.
Exceptions: securities transactions § 41 Ia GWB; exemption in individual cases § 41 II GWB.
7. Substantive prohibition review (§ 36 GWB / Art. 2 FK-VO)
SIEC test ("Significant Impediment to Effective Competition"): prohibition if the concentration is likely to significantly impede effective competition , in particular through the creation or strengthening of a dominant position. Presumption of market dominance § 18 IV GWB as an indicator.
Review steps:
- Market definition by product / geographic / temporal criteria (demand-side market concept; SSNIP test).
- Market shares and market structure indicators (HHI; barriers to entry; innovation potential).
- Horizontal / vertical / conglomerate effects; coordinated vs. non-coordinated effects.
- Efficiency advantages / failing firm defence.
- Commitments / conditions (divestiture, behavioural remedies).
- In the alternative, ministerial authorisation § 42 GWB in the case of overriding public interest.
8. Appeal § 73 GWB
Appeal to the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court (Cartel Senate) is available against prohibition decisions, deadline 1 month from service (§ 73 II GWB). Appeal on points of law to the BGH Cartel Senate pursuant to § 77 GWB.
Sources and citation style
Binding: ../../../references/zitierweise.md.
Statute
- § 35 GWB (thresholds for intervention — turnover + transaction value § 35 Ia)
- § 36 GWB (prohibition requirements — SIEC test, de minimis clause)
- § 37 GWB (concentration)
- § 38 GWB (calculation of turnover, affiliated companies)
- § 39 GWB (notification to the BKartA)
- § 40 GWB (preliminary review 1 month / main review 4 months)
- § 41 GWB (prohibition of implementation)
- § 42 GWB (ministerial authorisation)
- § 73 GWB (appeal to the Düsseldorf Higher Regional Court)
- § 81 GWB (fine framework up to 10 % of group turnover)
- Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004 (EU Merger Regulation)
- supplementary: BKartA, Guidance on the transaction value threshold (jointly with BWB, as of 2018/2022
[unverifiziert]); BKartA, Information sheet on domestic effect; COM, Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice (OJ 2008 C 95/1).
Commentaries
- Mestmäcker/Veelken, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, Wettbewerbsrecht GWB, 6th ed. 2020, §§ 35 et seq. marginal no. 1 et seq.
- Bechtold/Bosch, GWB, 11th ed. 2024, §§ 35–41 marginal no. 1 et seq.
[unverifiziert – Auflagenstand] - Riesenkampff/Lehr, in: Loewenheim/Meessen/Riesenkampff/Kersting/Meyer-Lindemann, Kartellrecht, 4th ed. 2020, § 35 GWB marginal no. 1 et seq.
- Körber, in: Immenga/Mestmäcker, EU-Wettbewerbsrecht, 6th ed. 2019, FKVO Art. 1 marginal no. 1 et seq.
[unverifiziert – Auflagenstand]
Case law and administrative practice ([unverifiziert – prüfen in juris/EuGH-Datenbank/BKartA-Website])
- BGH, order of 25.09.2007 – KVR 19/07, Sulzer/Kelmix (acquisition of competitively significant influence)
- BGH, order of 14.11.2017 – KVR 57/15, EDEKA/Tengelmann (Ministerial authorisation § 42 GWB)
[unverifiziert – Az. zu prüfen, BGH-Beschl. v. 14.11.2017 trägt Az. KVR 57/16] - General Court, judgment of 28.05.2020 – T-399/16, CK Telecoms (market definition, SIEC test)
- Court of Justice, judgment of 04.03.2020 – C-10/18 P, Marine Harvest (gun-jumping, Art. 7 FK-VO)
- BKartA, activity reports with fines for gun-jumping (e.g. Mars/Nutro 2008).
- COM, M.7217 Facebook/WhatsApp; M.8124 Microsoft/LinkedIn; M.10262 Illumina/Grail (Phase II)
[unverifiziert – KOM-Fallnummer prüfen; Illumina/GRAIL trägt die Fallnummer M.10188]
Output format
ANMELDUNGS- UND RISK-MEMO – Zusammenschlussvorhaben
Beteiligte: <Erwerber> / <Zielgesellschaft>
Stand: <Datum>
I. Sachverhalt
- Transaktionsstruktur
- Beteiligte und Konzern
- Umsätze (weltw. / EU / Inland — letzte 3 GJ)
- Märkte (sachlich / räumlich)
- Geplantes Signing/Closing
II. Frage(n)
1. Liegt ein Zusammenschluss iSd § 37 GWB / Art. 3 FK-VO vor?
2. Sind Aufgreifschwellen § 35 GWB oder § 35 Ia GWB erreicht?
3. Greift vorrangig die EU-FK-VO (One-Stop-Shop)?
4. Welche Frist-Risiken (Vorprüfung, Hauptprüfung, Vollzugsverbot)?
5. Welche materiellen Untersagungsrisiken (SIEC-Test)?
III. Kurzantwort (1 Satz pro Frage)
IV. Rechtliche Bewertung
1. Zusammenschlusstatbestand § 37 GWB
2. Aufgreifschwellen
a) § 35 I GWB
b) § 35 Ia GWB (Transaktionswert + Inlands-Nexus)
3. One-Stop-Shop Art. 1, 21 EU-FK-VO
4. Anmeldepflicht und Anmeldungsbestandteile § 39 GWB
5. Vollzugsverbot § 41 GWB / Art. 7 FK-VO
6. Materielle Würdigung (SIEC § 36 GWB / Art. 2 FK-VO)
- Marktabgrenzung
- Marktanteile und Wettbewerbsdruck
- Effizienzen / Auflagen-Optionen
7. Verfahrens- und Rechtsmittelweg (§ 73 GWB, OLG Düsseldorf)
V. Anmeldeschrift-Skizze (Outline für Form A / Form CO)
VI. Frist-Kalender
- Anmeldung vor Signing/Closing?
- Vorprüfung Endtermin: <Datum + 1 Monat>
- Hauptprüfung-Frist: <Datum + 4 Monate>
- Vollzug erlaubt frühestens am: <Datum>
VII. Risiken / offene Punkte
🟢 / 🟡 / 🔴 <Einstufung mit Begründung>
- Gun-Jumping-Risiko?
- Untersagungs-Wahrscheinlichkeit?
- Auflagen-Bedarf?
VIII. Quellenverzeichnis
Example (extract, expert-opinion style)
A. The acquisition of 100% of the shares in B-GmbH by A-AG is a concentration within the meaning of § 37 I no. 3 lit. b GWB, since the 50% threshold is reached. The thresholds for intervention under § 35 I GWB are met according to the turnovers stated in the facts (worldwide > EUR 500 million; domestic turnover of A-AG > EUR 50 million; domestic turnover of B-GmbH > EUR 17.5 million). Since the EU thresholds under Art. 1 FK-VO are not met with the aggregated Union turnover of approx. ..., exclusive competence remains with the Bundeskartellamt. The concentration must therefore be notified pursuant to § 39 GWB prior to implementation Implementation prior to clearance is prohibited under § 41 I GWB and is punishable by a fine under § 81 II no. 1 GWB of up to 10% of the worldwide group turnover of the penultimate financial year (cf. Court of Justice, judgment of 04.03.2020 – C-10/18 P, Marine Harvest). ...
Risks / typical mistakes
- Closing before clearance (gun-jumping). 🔴 BLOCKER. Even preparatory integration measures without a clean team can constitute implementation.
- Forgetting the transaction value threshold § 35 Ia GWB in tech/pharma acquisitions with low target turnover but high purchase price.
- Incorrect turnover attribution (affiliated undertakings § 36 II GWB, seller group versus acquirer group, turnover reference date § 38 GWB).
- Overlooking EU primacy in the case of very large groups — notification to the BKartA although Art. 1 FK-VO is satisfied.
- Full-function criterion for the JV not examined (permanently autonomous on the market; Form CO Section 7).
- Missing market definition where market shares are close — risk of prohibition underestimated.
- No remedies options considered in parallel (divestiture of business unit, licences, hold-separate).
- Appeal period § 73 II GWB (1 month) missed.